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Article 3

Governance by Proxy
CYBER CHALLENGES TO CIVIL LIBERTIES
Niva Elkin-Koren† & Eldar Haber††
INTRODUCTION
The greatest challenges we are likely to face in the
information environment over the next decade are challenges to
civil liberties. For a long time, members of society in liberal
democracies have taken civil liberties for granted, as they have
been reasonably secured by well-established constitutional
principles, the separation of powers, and a bill of rights. Recent
developments suggest, however, that those checks and balances
may no longer be sufficient to secure civil liberties in the years
to come.
One reason for the risk to civil liberties is a governance
crisis, which gives rise to new types of collaboration between
governments and online intermediaries in managing online
behavior. The distributed nature of Internet architecture shifted
power from traditional governing institutions to individual
users.1 End users can mass communicate content,2 raise
significant funds, create and share economic value, and engage
in political action, thereby bypassing mass media, firms, and
political parties.3 The distributed nature of the Internet, at the
initial stages of its development, shifted power from traditional
institutions to end users, acting alone or in collaboration with

† Professor of Law, University of Haifa, Faculty of Law; Director, Haifa
Center for Law & Technology, University of Haifa, Faculty of Law.
†† Assistant Professor, University of Haifa, Faculty of Law; Faculty Associate,
Berkman-Klein Center for Internet & Society, Harvard University. This research was
funded by the Israeli Ministry of Science, Technology and Space (MOST).
1 Yochai Benkler, Degrees of Freedom, Dimensions of Power, 145 DAEDELUS
18, 19–20 (2016).
2 See MANUEL CASTELLS, COMMUNICATION POWER xix (2013).
3 See generally CLAY SHIRKY, HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF
ORGANIZING WITHOUT ORGANIZATIONS (2008) (arguing that the advent of online social
tools has reduced the transaction cost of collaboration, and enabled individual users to
act together without needing to rely on traditional institutions).
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others.4 From the perspective of governments, this shift has
created a governance challenge; how does the government ensure
public safety, secure critical infrastructure, and safeguard
national security in an era of open communication networks?
In order to address these issues, governments increasingly
rely on informal collaboration with the private sector in
cybersecurity, surveillance, censorship, and general law
enforcement tasks. PRISM—a surveillance program of the
National Security Agency (NSA)—is a classic example of
surveillance and data sharing between online intermediaries
and government agencies.5 Under PRISM, the NSA targeted
the contents of communications from nine major U.S. Internet
companies through, inter alia, a partnership.6 In other cases,
intermediaries complied with informal calls to remove content
or block access to websites or users.7
The revelations of Edward Snowden in 2013 regarding
numerous surveillance programs like PRISM,8 which were
conducted by governmental agencies, should have been a
wakeup call to the general public on how informal collaboration
between online intermediaries and the government could turn
the Internet into a robust system of surveillance and control.
Overall, the Snowden revelations demonstrated the deep crisis
of safeguarding civil liberties in liberal democracies. The NSA
surveillance programs9 provoked some litigation and legislative
initiatives challenging the legality of these surveillance practices
and the extent to which they comply with constitutional
safeguards.10 The recently enacted Cybersecurity Act of 2015
(Cybersecurity Act) sought to remedy some of these concerns
following a series of subsequent governmental reports.11
So far, however, the legal initiatives of policymakers in
the post-Snowden era have overlooked the innovative
4 See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006);
William H. Dutton, The Fifth Estate Emerging Through the Network of Networks, 27
PROMETHEUS 1, 2 (2009).
5 See infra Part I.
6 See infra Part II.
7 Angela Daly, Private Power and New Media: The Case of the Corporate
Suppression of WikiLeaks and Its Implications for the Exercise of Fundamental Rights
on the Internet, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND RISKS IN THE DIGITAL ERA: GLOBALIZATION AND
THE EFFECTS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES 81 (Christina M. Akrivopoulou &
Nicolaos Garipidis eds., 2012); see, e.g., infra note 44.
8 See Glenn Greenwald & Ewen MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to
User Data of Apple, Google, and Others, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013), http://www.guardian.
co.uk/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data [https://perma.cc/5XF4-PUXZ].
9 See infra Section II.A.
10 See infra Section IV.B.
11 See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129
Stat. 2242 (2015) (codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1510 (2012)).
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governance structure typical of online government practices.
The Snowden revelations placed a spotlight on an intriguing
public-private partnership (PPP). In a typical PPP, a public
government entity, who is otherwise constitutionally restricted
in its ability to search through electronic data of users, requests
that the private entity do the actual searching and pass on
certain types of information. Informal PPPs enable governments
to bypass constitutional constraints because private bodies are
not subject to constitutional limits on search or censorship and
are under no duty to respect free speech or other fundamental
rights.12 Intermediaries are often offered immunity from civil
lawsuits by users whose interests were compromised by an
intermediary’s action or inaction.13 Consequently, citizens could
be left without any remedy as a result of the nature of these
PPPs. In the absence of any mechanisms to hold governments
and intermediaries accountable, informal PPPs pose a new type
of threat to civil liberties.
This emerging form of governance partnership between
the state and the private sector raises new challenges. A decade
ago, one of the authors warned that the regulatory framework in
the post-9/11 era may facilitate this type of informal
collaboration, termed the invisible handshake, between the state
and the private sector.14 The Snowden revelations showed that
this new type of PPP is even broader than predicted. They
further stressed challenges involved in bringing this type of
practice under the rule of law. While the post-Snowden era has
presumably brought the PPP between the government and
online intermediaries to light, the PPP essentially remains as
invisible as before because the details of its operation remain
unknown. More importantly, the new type of collaboration
between government and online intermediaries in governance
evades the rule of law. It is executed in a regulatory twilight
zone, which keeps this type of collaboration beyond the reach of
constitutional law and outside the reach of the market powers
that could push back against it.
What is the future of such alliances? It is not clear, as
secrecy played a crucial role in the success of the PPP. What is
most intriguing in the post-Snowden era is that the exposure of
12 See Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake: The
Reemergence of the State in the Digital Environment, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 55 (2003).
13 See infra Section II.B.
14 Michael Birnhack and Niva Elkin-Koren coined this form of public-private
partnership as the “invisible handshake,” warning that such handshake could persist under
the current regulatory framework without proper checks and balances. See Birnhack &
Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 6.
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PPPs did not prompt social or market powers to cease them,
but instead led to their formal incorporation into law.15
Consequently, PPPs are now encouraged by the law through
incentives, but remain invisible to the public as before. In other
words, not only did Snowden’s revelations fail to increase
protection of freedom and liberties, they led to an even more
robust, and now legalized, system of surveillance.
This article scrutinizes the governance by proxy that
occurs under the new type of PPP and the legal twilight zone
that facilitates it. It identifies the gaps in the law and offers
some insights on how to address them. Part I introduces the
governance crisis and describes the role of online intermediaries
in the new governance models, focusing on the case of PRISM.
Part II describes the legal twilight zone in which informal
governance by intermediaries takes place. It compares the legal
framework for PPPs prior to the information era with the legal
regime that facilitated the rise of PRISM. Part III reviews the
constitutional and statutory frameworks that facilitate the
invisible handshake and examines it from the perspective of
both the government and online intermediaries as state actors.
Part IV evaluates potential social and legal interventions that
might be necessary to protect liberty and freedom and suggests
turning to organizational design to significantly improve such
protection. Ultimately, this article calls for a restructuring of
the legal regime that governs PPPs.
I.

THE PUBLIC PRIVATE HANDSHAKE: GOVERNANCE VIA
ONLINE INTERMEDIARIES

A.

The Governance Crisis

The Internet shifted power from central institutions (e.g.,
governments), organizations (e.g., mass media), and design
infrastructure (e.g., mainframe) to end-users. Internet
architecture enabled any end user to tinker with systems, change
its design, directly connect with another, create content, and
share content without filtering. The distributed architecture of
the Internet raised high hopes for transforming fundamental
economic structures and enabling new levels of political freedom.16
It made it possible for individuals to connect, collaborate, share,
deliberate, and act together efficiently and effectively.17 It
15 See Cybersecurity Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2935, 2935–
56 (2015) (codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1510 (2012)).
16 See generally BENKLER, supra note 4.
17 See generally id.
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facilitated mass communication by individuals on a scale that
was once the sole province of mass media.18 Individuals now
use social media to engage in ad hoc political action: filing
online petitions, recruiting supporters, and organizing street
protests and boycotts. The dispersed wisdom of strangers gives
crowds the advantage of political power capable of responding
quickly and authentically to ongoing challenges. In this sense,
online crowds could be thought of as a “fifth estate,”19
supplementing mass media (the “fourth estate”) and remedying
its commercial and political biases. They could act as a
counterforce, capable of pushing against the misuse of power
and improving government accountability.
All in all, the distributed nature of the Internet has
many virtues. It is responsible for the greatest benefits of the
Internet: flourishing innovation, democratization of education,
access to knowledge, political participation by many, and the
export of democratic values from liberal democracies to nondemocratic regions. But the unmediated nature of the Internet,
which gave rise to the innovation burst, economic flourishing,
and political aphorism, has also created a governance crisis. It
has challenged the conventional way of governance and has
introduced new types of threats.
The decentralized nature of the Internet makes systems
and individuals more vulnerable and leads to greater risks. As
society becomes more connected to, and dependent upon,
instant, online access to services, it becomes necessary to offer
security not only to critical infrastructure, but also to smalland medium-sized businesses, and to individual users. Security
specialists are concerned that cyberspace could make it easier
for extremists and terrorists to conceal their identities and
actions, to reach out to their supporters, and to communicate
with one another more efficiently than before.20 Governments
must protect against these risks—risks to the integrity of their
data and the functionality of their systems, and risks to public
safety and national security.
See CASTELLS, supra note 2, at xix–xv.
Dutton, supra note 4. The historical conception of feudal societies was
traditionally divided into three “estates of the realm.” See KAREN ORREN, BELATED
FEUDALISM: LABOR, THE LAW AND LIBERAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1991).
The fifth estate could take various forms. Relating to the Internet, Stephen Cooper argued
that bloggers are the fifth estate, while William Dutton argued that any networked
individuals—not just bloggers—are the fifth estate. See generally STEPHEN D. COOPER,
WATCHING THE WATCHDOG: BLOGGERS AS THE FIFTH ESTATE (2006); Dutton, supra note 4.
20 RICHARD A. CLARKE ET AL., LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON INTELLIGENCE AND
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGIES 71 (2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZAB-PGUL].
18
19
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Digital networks are in many ways a disruptive
technology for the state. An open network, where power lies with
the users at the end nodes, is inconsistent with the fundamental
principles of command and control.21 When individual users have
the potential power to cause significant harm, law enforcement
agencies seek ways to predict threats, prepare for them, and
prevent them ahead of time. If every user can share information
online, without any filtering, how can governments stop the
sharing of data that harms individual privacy? How can
governments stop the distribution of malware, detect those who
incite violence, or identify calls for political unrest? The standard
measures of governance are losing power.
The nature of cyber threats is dispersed. Many times,
cyber attacks are difficult and expensive to detect22 and to
attribute to a specific attacker.23 Illegal behavior might still be
expensive and difficult to track when conducted by massive
numbers of users.24 Even if authorities are able to determine the
actor of a cyber threat, the threat might originate from
individuals outside their jurisdiction. This could make it difficult
to track potential offenders or bring them to trial.25
21 See, e.g., Julia Black, Critical Reflections on Regulation, 27 AUSTL. J. LEG.
PHIL. 1, 2 (2002). Such form of regulation usually refers to state regulation using legal
rules backed by sanctions.
22 Detection, in many instances, will usually occur only after a successful
attack, while the attacker can conduct endless attempts until successful. This is highly
different from many other types of crimes or acts of terror. Usually, committing crimes
and acts of terrorism necessitate risk of detection. Therefore, in cyberattacks, the attacker
has a very high probability of success (because if he does not succeed, he will not be
sanctioned), which highly impacts the potential deterrent effect. For a similar argument,
see Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense and
Deterrence in Cyberspace, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 451 (2012). Moreover, in many
instances, even if disruption in digital networks is discovered, it will not be clear whether
the disruption was caused by an attack or a malfunction. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROT., CRITICAL FOUNDATIONS: PROTECTING AMERICA’S
INFRASTRUCTURES 18 (1997) (“Computer intrusions do not announce their presence the
way a bomb does. . . . It sometimes takes months, even years, to determine the
significance of individual computer attacks.”).
23 Eric Talbot Jensen, Cyber Warfare and Precautions Against the Effects of
Attacks, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1533, 1536 (2010) (stating that “thousands of companies” are
victims of cyberattacks but “the companies do not even know they are compromised until
law enforcement authorities tell them”); Zhen Zhang, Cybersecurity Policy for the
Electricity Sector: The First Step to Protecting Our Critical Infrastructure from Cyber
Threats, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 319, 330 (2013) (“Cyber events are difficult to predict,
plan for, and identify.”).
24 See Michael L. Rustad, Private Enforcement of Cybercrime on the Electronic
Frontier, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 63, 66 (2001) (“Law enforcement resources in
cyberspace cannot keep pace with sophisticated cybercrime subcultures in anonymous
offshore havens.”).
25 When an attack occurs from beyond the physical borders of the state, then it
could have various ramifications in terms of enforcement and jurisdiction. It generally
becomes difficult to decide what happened where and enforcement is more difficult. For
more on the meaning of physical and digital borders in “cyberspace” (referring to the
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Crowdfunding online, and the ability to raise and
transfer funds anonymously outside the banking system, poses
yet another challenge for the enforcement agencies, due to its
anonymized nature.26 Ad hoc groups often lack a sustainable
organizational structure, which makes it difficult to monitor
them and restrain their illegal activities.27 In the absence of a
formal organizational structure, law enforcement agencies
must identify individually each and every actor in a potentially
illicit behavior. Online crowds are also more difficult to deter.
Unlike repeat players, such as firms, political parties, or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), ad hoc crowds lack longterm interests and therefore risk management is less likely to
play a mitigating role. Therefore, ad hoc crowds are less likely
to respond to monetary sanctions.
Overall, users acting online, either alone or in
collaboration, without any formal organizational structure are
difficult to govern. The existence of potentially powerful tools in
the hands of users may require law enforcement agencies to
monitor each user. It is not a question of whether bulk
surveillance will aid the government in protecting national
security or merely reduce that risk at the margin.28 It is mostly a
question of governance; law enforcement efforts cannot rely on
existing institutions or organizational structures.
Governments have reacted to this governance crisis in
various ways. Some states have pushed for more centralized
Internet) see David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996); Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91
CALIF. L. REV. 521 (2003). See also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 23–24 (2006)
(arguing that controlling commercial online gambling is much more problematic in the
online environment than in the physical world, mainly because of jurisdiction); Kesan &
Hayes, supra note 22, at 454 (discussing the difficulties in determining whether the state
acquired jurisdiction).
26 See generally JEAN-LOUP RICHET, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUG & CRIME,
LAUNDERING MONEY ONLINE: A REVIEW OF CYBERCRIMINALS’ METHODS (2013), http:// arxiv.
org/abs/1310.2368 [https://perma.cc/3E4L-U2XL] (describing methods that criminals use to
launder money online).
27 TAYLOR OWEN, DISRUPTIVE POWER: THE CRISIS OF THE STATE IN THE
DIGITAL AGE 93–94 (2015).
28 In programs conducted under section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, the NSA
reported that they disrupted fifty-four terrorist incidents. See Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism
(USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287–90 (2001)
(codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1862); Ellen Nakashima, NSA Cites Case as Success of
Phone Data-Collection Program, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/nationalsecurity/nsa-cites-case-as-success-of-phone-data-collection-program/2013/
08/08/fc915e5a-feda-11e2-96a8-d3b921c0924a_story.html [https://perma.cc/N4WK-Q35E].
Other reports suggest lower numbers. See Strengthening Privacy Rights and National
Security: Oversight of FISA Surveillance Programs: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 113th Cong. 9 (2013) (statement of John C. Inglis, Deputy Dir., Nat’l. Sec.
Agency, stating that the program helped in about twelve of thirteen cases).
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control over the Internet. For instance, as a backlash to the
Snowden revelations, countries such as Russia and Brazil
announced plans to nationalize Internet infrastructure.29 Other
countries, like the United States, reacted to these new governance
challenges by implementing innovative governance strategies.30
These new governance strategies may include the use of mass
surveillance and big data analysis to monitor potential risks, the
use of algorithms in law enforcement efforts,31 and the
involvement of online intermediaries in governance efforts. These
strategies challenge traditional thinking about safeguards for civil
rights. Basically, this new approach to Internet governance takes
advantage of the network—and employs network strategies—to
secure public safety, cybersecurity, and law enforcement.
B.

Governance via Online Intermediaries

Economies of scale led to the domination of online
services by a small number of multinational mega platforms.32
Online access, distribution, and exchange are hosted, facilitated,
and mediated by a variety of online platforms such as Internet
Services Providers, search engines (e.g., Google, Yahoo!), social
media platforms (e.g., Facebook, Twitter), or hosting services (e.g.,
Apple, Amazon, YouTube). Online platforms have experienced a
high level of growth, consolidation, and market concentration.
Largely, this growth can be attributed to the fact that much of
the costs of producing these platforms “is unrelated to the
number of users of the service, [and thus] the average cost of
providing service to each additional user may fall as the
number of users increases.”33 But economies of scale reduce the
level of competition. Cost of entry is rapidly rising as the
Internet continues to grow and as competition becomes more
sophisticated.34 A strong network effect gives advantages to
large-scale intermediaries, such as Google’s search engine, and
29 See Amanda Holpuch, Brazil’s Controversial Plan to Extricate the Internet
from US Control, GUARDIAN (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
sep/20/brazil-dilma-rousseff-internet-us-control [https://perma.cc/2J5M-2H7N].
30 See infra Part II.
31 Algorithmic law enforcement becomes prevalent for detecting illicit behavior,
for removing harmful materials, blocking access, or disabling the risk. Maayan Perel &
Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2016).
32 NIVA ELKIN-KOREN & ELI M. SALZBERGER, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE DIGITAL AGE: THE LIMITS OF ANALYSIS 170 (2013).
33 Id.
34 See Directorate Gen. for Internal Policies, Policy Dep’t, Econ. & Sci. Policy,
Presentation: Challenges for Competition Policy in a Digitalised Economy, at 25,
IP/A/Econ/2014-12 (July 2015).
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to global social networks, such as Facebook, which currently
attract the most traffic by users on a global scale.35 Consequently,
a handful of online intermediaries dominate the access to content,
people, and communication infrastructure in the digital ecosystem.
Online intermediaries exercise control over content (as
publishers of applications and media content), access and
distribution channels, and, finally, end users’ personal data and
devices (e.g., Kindle, iPhone). By establishing direct contact
with each user through the access service (e.g., search, display,
Internet access, or a playing device), mega intermediaries may
monitor the use of content by individual users on an ongoing
basis.36 Intermediaries can then collect data on users’ interests,
consumption habits, opinions, and tastes.37 Online intermediaries
may also enable or disable access, by either removing or blocking
controversial content, or by terminating the user account
altogether. “Intermediaries offer a natural point of control for
monitoring, filtering, blocking and disabling” access to content,38
which makes them ideal partners for performing civil and
criminal enforcement.
The informal collaboration between government and
online intermediaries is becoming an important governance tool
in the twenty-first century: “In a global information network
that has no geographical boundaries, law enforcement agencies
are increasingly facing difficulties in gathering intelligence,
finding suspects, controlling activities and generally, enforcing

35 See Top 15 Most Popular Websites, EBIZ MBA, http://www.ebizmba.com/
articles/most-popular-websites [https://perma.cc/77XM-X6DJ].
36 Almost everything end users do on digital networks is known to private parties.
Google, Facebook, PalTalk, AOL, Skype, YouTube, Apple, and even cloud storage and
synchronization services, (e.g., Dropbox), possess knowledge of what users are doing. Mobile
companies know exactly where users are at almost any given time, and where they have
been since joining their services. Information is the heart of most of these systems. It is
essential for their operation and business models. Many of these companies analyze these
stores of data for their own purposes, (e.g., marketing and research), or divulge it to other
parties. See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1084 (2002) [hereinafter Solove, Digital Dossiers]. For more
on data mining, see for example, Ira S. Rubinstein, Ronald D. Lee & Paul M. Schwartz,
Data Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerging Regulatory and Technological Approaches, 75
U. CHI. L. REV. 261, 262–70 (2008); Daniel J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty
Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343, 353 (2008); K. A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic
Security: Connecting the Dots to Make Sense of Data, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 21–
74 (2003).
37 See, e.g., Emilee Rader, Awareness of Behavioral Tracking and Information
Privacy Concern in Facebook and Google, TENTH SYMP. ON USABLE PRIVACY & SECURITY
(SOUPS) 51, 51 (2014), https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/soups2014/soups14paper-rader.pdf [https://perma.cc/H684-SPGF].
38 See Niva Elkin-Koren, After Twenty Years: Revisiting Copyright Liability of
Online Intermediaries, in THE EVOLUTION AND EQUILIBRIUM OF COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL
AGE 44 (Susy Frankel & Daniel Gervais eds., 2014).
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the law.”39 As a result of this, the collaboration with online
intermediaries, often global platforms, becomes essential. There
are numerous examples of pressing private intermediaries into
performing public functions, like enforcement, in collaboration
with law enforcement agencies. Recently, in the aftermath of the
2015 Paris attacks,40 American politicians called upon Twitter to
remove pro-Islamic State Twitter accounts—the same way childpornography sites are being tracked and blocked.41 User
accounts of the group of activists and hacktivists commonly
known as Anonymous, could be considered “terrorist” as they
have the potential to jeopardize national security42—although
Anonymous has recently called upon its hackers to fight ISIS.43
Online intermediaries are therefore called upon to decide who is a
terrorist, and what should be considered a threat to public safety.
Over the past decade, online intermediaries have complied with
informal calls from governmental actors and society to remove
content or block access to websites or users.44
Governments increasingly rely on informal collaboration
with online intermediaries in cybersecurity, surveillance,

39 Michael Birnack & Niva Elkin-Koren, WikiHunt and the (In)visible
Handshake, OPENDEMOCRACY (Feb. 20, 2011), https://www.opendemocracy.net/michaelbirnack-niva-elkin-koren/wikihunt-and-invisible-handshake [https://perma.cc/H9A7-YL2E].
40 See Claire Phipps & Kevin Rawlinson, Paris Attacks Kill More Than 120
People—As It Happened, GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
live/2015/nov/13/shootings-reported-in-eastern-paris-live [https://perma.cc/6G2M-UTL6].
41 Andrew Blake, Social Media Companies, Politicians Push to Ax Pro-ISIS
Accounts, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/dec/7/
social-media-companies-politicians-push-axe-pro-is [https://perma.cc/9ZCW-MFRG]. For
more on blocking child-pornography sites in the United States, see Internet Providers
Block Child Pornography, CBS (June 23, 2008), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/internetproviders-block-child-pornography [https://perma.cc/Y9V5-C383].
42 See Kevin Rawlinson & Paul Peachey, Hackers Step Up War on Security
Services, INDEP. (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/hackersstep-up-war-on-security-services-7640780.html [https://perma.cc/M985-GNDD].
43 Hacking Group Anonymous Disables Thousands of Pro-ISIS Twitter
Accounts and Taking Militant Websites Offline, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 18, 2015), http://
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3323597/Activist-hackers-battle-Islamic-State-cyber
space.html [https://perma.cc/8W9Y-KFZM].
44 For example, in 2010, Amazon stopped hosting WikiLeaks on its servers,
and the online payment service PayPal suspended the account used by WikiLeaks to
collect donations. See Doug Gross, WikiLeaks Cut Off from Amazon Servers, CNN (Dec.
2, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/12/01/wikileaks.amazon [https://perma.cc/9MLZ2W6H]; Robert Mendick, Paypal Cuts Off Donations to WikiLeaks, TELEGRAPH (Dec. 4,
2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/8181140/Paypal-cuts-off-donat
ions-to-WikiLeaks.html [https://perma.cc/SK6G-6ZA2]. Another example can be taken from
2012, in which YouTube voluntarily blocked access in Egypt and Libya to an antiIslamic video, which ridiculed the Prophet Muhammad, titled “The Innocence of the
Muslim.” See Claire Cain Miller, As Violence Spreads in Arab World, Google Blocks Access
to Inflammatory Video, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/14/
technology/google-blocks-inflammatory-video-in-egypt-and-libya.html [https://perma.cc/87
5T-793F].
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censorship, and general law enforcement tasks.45 Social media
and search engines create gigantic archives of exchanges
among identified participants, which enable surveillance at the
individual and social levels.46 The bulk of data generated by
online intermediaries, combined with analytic capabilities, is
often perceived as a tool that could aid law enforcement agencies
in protecting the public from cybersecurity threats and
terrorism.47 Collaboration with online intermediaries could
become a powerful tool in exercising law enforcement powers.
Social media analytics may enable governments to find out: Who
is saying what, and where is the conversation happening? What
is the volume of the buzz, and what is the sentiment? Who is
leading the conversation, and what is their influence? Search
engines could offer governments information on search trends
and individual interests. Yet, such use of governmental powers
must be subject to the rule of law, or else it may severely
compromise civil rights.
This form of informal collaboration was acknowledged
long before Snowden’s revelations. In 2003, Michal Birnhack
and Niva Elkin-Koren warned against the rise of an invisible
handshake between the government and online intermediaries.
The term originates from the invisible hand—a metaphor
coined by Adam Smith to describe the market forces that drive
the economy and that often make government intervention
redundant.48 Market players, acting in their own self-interest,
will react to demand, which reflects the preferences of members
of society, and thus promotes the social good.49 The invisible
handshake is the informal coordination between the government
and market players, which is executed in a legal twilight zone:
while governments are authorized to operate under the rule of
law within constitutional restraints, such informal PPP enables
governments to bypass constitutional constraints.50 Private
45 See generally YOCHAI BENKLER, THE PENGUIN AND THE LEVIATHAN: HOW
COOPERATION TRIUMPHS OVER SELF-INTEREST (2011).
46 See generally BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES
TO COLLECT YOUR DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD (2015).
47 Cf. id. at 136 (arguing that while data mining is offered as a technique that
could aid law enforcement agencies in protecting the public from cybersecurity threats
and terrorism, it is “an inappropriate tool for finding terrorists”).
48 See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Sálvio Marcelo Soares ed., 2007) (1776), http://www.ibiblio.org/
ml/libri/s/SmithA_WealthNations_p.pdf [https://perma.cc/P63A-SK56].
49 Id. at 349–50 (“By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign
industry, he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a
manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he
is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was
no part of his intention.”).
50 See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 53–59; see infra Part II.
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bodies are not subject to constitutional limits on search or
censorship and are under no duty to respect free speech or other
fundamental rights.51 Intermediaries are often offered immunity
against civil lawsuits by users whose interests were compromised
by the intermediary’s action or inaction.52 By collaborating
through a PPP, not only will the government avoid facing a
constitutional challenge in court, market players will not be held
accountable to their customers. Moreover, these players may gain
the benefits of collaborating with the government, which could set
government rules and regulations in their favor.53
All in all, both online intermediaries and governmental
agents have much to gain from such informal collaboration, and
are therefore likely to have strong incentives to sustain it. Yet,
the exercise of governmental powers in such a legal limbo may
leave citizens without an effective remedy, neither against the
government nor against the mega intermediaries. Consequently,
in the absence of any mechanisms for holding governments and
online intermediaries accountable, informal PPPs pose a new
type of threat to civil liberties.
II.

A LEGAL TWILIGHT ZONE

A.

Governmental Surveillance Programs: From Targeted
Collection to Mass Surveillance

One response to the governance crisis created by dispersed
networks is for governments to seek access to data. Governments
require access to bulk data and metadata in order to analyze it for
the purpose of identifying patterns and correlations, and to detect
and predict potential threats to public safety, cybersecurity, and
national security.54 Governance challenges regarding access to
information began prior to the emergence of the Internet. When
private companies first offered telecommunications networks to
the public, governments were left without legal mechanisms to
control and access information. In response, governments
initiated various forms of surveillance programs.
See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 54–55.
See infra Section II.B.
53 See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 57 (“ISPs may benefit from
collaborating with the government in various ways.”). Jon Michaels termed these publicprivate partnerships as “handshake agreements.” See Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s
Spies: Private-Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901,
904 (2008).
54 See generally U.S. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING
OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES (2014,) https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/46XK-WG5B].
51

52
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U.S. government surveillance programs date back to at
least the early 1930s.55 Various forms of surveillance took place
in the United States,56 and the public was largely unaware of
such programs until the Watergate scandal.57 In 1968, Congress
sought to regulate electronic surveillance for the first time.58 The
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act conditioned the
usage of electronic surveillance upon a judicial finding of probable
cause to believe the target is committing, has committed, or is
about to commit a particular enumerated offense, and that the
surveillance would obtain incriminating communications about
the offense.59 However, surveillance for national security purposes
was still broadly permitted.60
In the post-Watergate era, Congress decided to further
study and regulate the proper scope of governmental operations
with respect to intelligence activities.61 In 1978, Congress
implemented the recommendations of the Church Committee—a
committee tasked by the U.S. Senate to study governmental
operations with respect to intelligence activities—in the
enactment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).62
FISA regulated “all electronic surveillance of American citizens
or permanent residents within the United States for foreign
intelligence or international counterterrorism purposes.”63
Under FISA, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)
was formed, while Congress created other mechanisms for
conducting surveillance outside of FISC.64 FISC is a “secret”
55 See S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 12 (1976) (“Since the early 1930’s, intelligence
agencies have frequently wiretapped and bugged American citizens without the benefit of
judicial warrant.”). For further information on U.S. surveillance prior to FISA, see G.
Alex Sinha, NSA Surveillance Since 9/11 and the Human Right to Privacy, 59 LOY. L.
REV. 861, 868–74 (2013) (describing the background of FISA enactment).
56 For example, as part of a surveillance program named SHAMROCK, between
1947 and 1973, the U.S. government collected millions of telegrams that originated within,
terminated in, or traveled through the United States. See S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 169.
57 See Sinha, supra note 55, at 871–72. For more on U.S. governmental
surveillance programs prior to FISA, see Laura K. Donohue, Anglo-American Privacy and
Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1072–94 (2006).
58 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351,
§§ 801–803, 82 Stat. 197, 211–25 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2012)).
59 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (1970); see Caitlin Thistle, A First Amendment Breach:
The National Security Agency’s Electronic Surveillance Program, 38 SETON HALL L. REV.
1197, 1200–01 (2008) (summarizing the history of FISA and governmental surveillance).
60 See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (2012).
61 See S. REP. NO. 94-755, at 12 (1976).
62 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat.
1783 (1978) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2012)).
63 See Sinha, supra note 55, at 873–74.
64 In addition to FISC orders, FISA created two other forms to initiate
surveillance. First, under the Attorney General’s Certification to collect information related
to foreign intelligence for up to one year. 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (2012). Second, when the Attorney
General reasonably determines that “an emergency situation exists with respect to the
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court, comprised of federal district judges who examine classified
information in a closed ex-parte hearing.65 FISC approval is
generally necessary for surveillance on Americans.66 Warrants
are authorized upon a finding of “probable cause to believe that
the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power.”67 Thus, FISC was formed out of a need
to balance the interests of the public and national security.
Beyond FISA, other forms of surveillance regulation
started to emerge—perhaps most importantly, Executive Order
12,333.68 First approved by President Ronald Reagan in 1981,
“Executive Order 12333 is the principal Executive Branch
authority for foreign intelligence activities not governed by
FISA.”69 Section 2.5 authorizes the Attorney General to approve
the use of any technique for intelligence purposes within the
United States or against a U.S. citizen abroad:
[F]or which a warrant would be required if undertaken for law
enforcement purposes, provided that such techniques shall not be
undertaken unless the Attorney General has determined in each
case that there is probable cause to believe that the technique is
directed against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.70

Executive Order 12,333 is still effective, though it has been
amended over the years, and it still plays an important role in
U.S. surveillance programs as further noted.71
The biggest changes to U.S. surveillance policy, and in
particular, to FISA,72 came at the beginning of the twenty-first
employment of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information.” Id.
§ 1805(e). Under this second provision, the Attorney General is obliged to submit a full
application in a defined timeframe from the initiation of authorization (twenty-four hours
under 1978’s version of FISA). Id. § 1805(e)(1)(D). For more on FISA, see generally
Donohue, supra note 57.
65 50 U.S.C. § 1805; see Dia Kayyali, What You Need to Know About the FISA
Court—and How It Needs to Change, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 15, 2014), https://
www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/08/what-you-need-know-about-fisa-court-and-how-it-needschange [https://perma.cc/P6YL-5UKT].
66 See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2)(A)–(B).
67 Id. § 1805(a)(2)(A). FISC judges can grant an ex parte order for electronic
surveillance when the application has been made by a federal officer and approved by the
Attorney General, and that, on the basis of the facts, there is probable cause to believe the
target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power and each of the facilities or places at
which the electronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is about to be used, by a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power. See id. § 1805(a).
68 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. pt. 1 (1981), amended by Exec. Order No.
13,284, 3 C.F.R. § 18 (2004), and by Exec. Order No. 13,355, 3 C.F.R. § 2 (2005), and
further amended by Exec. Order No. 13,470, 3 C.F.R. §§ 1–5 (2009).
69 CLARKE ET AL., supra note 20, at 69 & n.44.
70 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. pt. 1 (1981); EDWARD C. LIU, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R42725, REAUTHORIZATION OF THE FISA AMENDMENTS ACT 3 (2013),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R42725.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JJA-35RC].
71 See infra Section II.B.
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century. In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the U.S.
government dramatically increased surveillance efforts. First, the
Bush administration ordered the NSA to eavesdrop on telephone
conversations by persons in the United States to combat terrorist
attacks.73 President George W. Bush also initiated a Terrorist
Surveillance Program (TSP), which operates outside of FISA, to
“intercept international communications into and out of the
United States” by persons linked to terrorist organizations.74
Second, Congress enacted the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act).75 The USA
PATRIOT Act added section 215 to FISA, which allowed
governmental agencies,76 under a FISC order, to compel
telecommunications providers to produce metadata77 and

72 FISA was amended in 1995 to authorize secret physical searches. 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1821–1829 (2000). In 1998, Congress granted the government “pen register” and
“trap-and-trace” authority by a FISA amendment, and later that year, also authorized
“FISC to issue orders compelling telephone service providers to permit the government
to install these devices upon a showing that the government seeks to obtain
information ‘relevant’ to a foreign intelligence investigation.” See 50 U.S.C. § 1842
(2012); CLARKE ET AL., supra note 20, at 83–84.
73 For an overview of the legal framework of eavesdropping in the United
States, see Jack M. Balkin, Essay, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State,
93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 17–25 (2008). These programs were presumably authorized by the
President’s broad and exclusive powers as Commander-in-Chief under Article II of the
Constitution, “to conduct warrantless surveillance of enemy forces for intelligence
purposes to detect and disrupt armed attacks on the United States,” U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 6–8 (2006), https://www.
justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2006/02/02/whitepaperonnsalegalauthorities.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Y3EY-U5BZ] [hereinafter LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES
OF NSA], or alternately that Congress authorized the President “to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001,” Authorization for Use of Military Force, S.J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. § 2(a) (2001)
(enacted); see also Adam Burton, Fixing FISA for Long War: Regulating Warrantless
Surveillance in the Age of Terrorism, 4 PIERCE L. REV. 381 (2006) (discussing the legality
of warrantless surveillance in the United States).
74 LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING ACTIVITIES OF NSA, supra note 73, at 5,
17; LIU, supra note 70, at 4–5.
75 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001). For more on the TSP, see for example, Zachery Keller, Note, Big Brother’s
Little Helpers: Telecommunication Immunity and the FISA Amendment Act of 2008, 70
OHIO ST. L.J. 1215, 1219–25 (2009).
76 More accurately, to the director of the FBI or a designee of the director
(whose rank shall be no lower than assistant special agent in charge). See 50 U.S.C.
§ 1861(a)(1) (2012).
77 Metadata by its essence does not include the content of calls. Based on
government reports, expert analysts used the acquired metadata to identify terrorist
activities and “determine whether known or suspected terrorists have been in contact with”
individuals in the United States. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY
METADATA UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 2–3 (2013).
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“tangible objects” if there were “reasonable grounds to believe”78
that the tangible things sought were “relevant to an authorized
investigation”79 “into foreign intelligence, international terrorism,
or espionage.”80 Congress amended this provision in 2005,81
requiring “reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible objects
sought [were] relevant to an authorized investigation (other than
a threat assessment)”82 “into foreign intelligence, international
terrorism, or espionage.”83 Practically, section 215 of FISA
represents a shift from the targeted collection of information to
mass surveillance. Under this section, the government has
employed bulk collection and “analysis of metadata associated
with telephone calls within, to, or from the United States.”84
The Protect America Act (PAA) replaced TSP in 2007.85
It amended FISA to increase governmental agencies’ ability to
collect foreign communications where the collection is directed
at one party that is reasonably believed to be outside the
United States.86 The PAA also granted the Attorney General and
78 See JOHN W. ROLLINS & EDWARD C. LIU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43134,
NSA SURVEILLANCE LEAKS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 5 (2013). The
meaning of “reasonable grounds to believe” is not defined by FISA. A report to Congress
on this matter noted:

[I]t may be helpful to look at appellate courts’ interpretations of the Stored
Communications Act (SCA), as it similarly authorizes law enforcement to
access telecommunications transactional records (as well as stored electronic
communications) upon a showing that “there are reasonable grounds to
believe” that the information sought is “relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation.” Under the SCA, the collection of stored email has
been held to meet that standard in the context of a “complex, large-scale mail
and wire fraud operation” in which “interviews of current and former
employees of the target company suggest that electronic mail is a vital
communication tool that has been used to perpetuate the fraudulent conduct”
and “various sources [have verified] that [the provider who had custody of the
email] provides electronic communications services to certain individual(s)
[under] investigation.”
Id. (second, third, and fourth alterations in original).
79 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b) (2012).
80 ROLLINS & LIU, supra note 78, at 5. The tangible items include records, books,
documents, papers, and other items. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a) (2012). Telephony metadata can
also be obtained by a national security letter (NSL). See 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (2012). Such a
letter can be issued by the Director of the FBI or his designee, only when the “records sought
are relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities.” Id. § 2709(b).
81 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006).
82 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A).
83 ROLLINS & LIU, supra note 78, at 4–5.
84 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 77, at 2. For more on metadata, see NISO,
UNDERSTANDING METADATA (2004), http://www.niso.org/publications/press/Understanding
Metadata.pdf [https://perma.cc/3QBX-MS7D].
85 See Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552, 552–57
(2007) (formerly codified in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
86 Id. § 105A.
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the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) the ability to
authorize the acquisition of “foreign intelligence information
concerning persons reasonably believed to be outside the United
States . . . for periods of up to one year.”87 In that sense, the PAA
excluded some intelligence activity outside of FISA.88 Of
relevance to this article, the PAA also established a framework
for private sector cooperation.89 In 2008, after the PAA expired,90
Congress enacted the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA).91
The FAA expanded the types of information that
intelligence agencies could obtain and added several new
requirements and procedures. Most importantly, section 702
allowed the government to intercept Internet and telephone
content of non-citizens abroad without individualized court
orders.92 With some limitations,93 the Attorney General and the
DNI could jointly authorize the targeting of non-U.S. persons
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States for
periods of up to one year.94 The FAA added a new requirement
that, when targeting U.S. citizens abroad, the government
must obtain an individualized court order (removing the power
granted to the Attorney General and the DNI by the PAA).95
Congress also expanded the pre-warrant surveillance window
for “emergencies” from seventy-two hours to one week.96
The metadata program took a turn in 2015. On May 7,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that the
87 Id. § 105B. For more on the PAA, see Juan P. Valdivieso, Recent
Developments, Protect America Act of 2007, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 581 (2008).
88 Valdivieso, supra note 87, at 582 (analyzing the PAA provisions).
89 Id. at 584 (analyzing PAA’s Private Sector provisions). Under authorized
acquisition, the Attorney General and the DNI can issue a directive to an individual to
“provide the government with all information, facilities, and assistance necessary to
accomplish the acquisition[,] . . . [and] compensate [them for their participation] at the
prevailing rate.” Protect America Act of 2007 § 105B(e), (f). ELIZABETH B. BAZAN,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34143, P.L. 110-55, THE PROTECT AMERICA ACT OF 2007:
MODIFICATIONS TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 8–9 (2008),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34143.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BTE-YFNQ].
90 The Protect America Act had a time limit of six months for new Directives
to be issued. See Protect America Act of 2007 § 6.
91 FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008).
For more on the FAA, see Keller, supra note 75, at 1226–35.
92 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a).
93 The government may not: (1) “intentionally target any person known at the
time of acquisition to be located in the United States;” (2) “intentionally target a person
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States if the purpose of such acquisition
is to target a particular, known person reasonably believed to be in the United States;” (3)
“intentionally target a United States person reasonably believed to be located outside the
United States;” (4) “intentionally acquire any communication as to which the sender and all
intended recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be located in the United
States;” and (5) must be “consistent with the fourth amendment.” Id. § 1881a(b).
94 Id. § 1881a(a).
95 Id. § 1881c(a)(2).
96 Id. § 1805(e).
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bulk metadata program exceeded the authorization granted by
section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, as requests must be tailored
to fit a particular investigation.97 Shortly after, on June 1, section
215 expired. One day later, Congress enacted the USA Freedom
Act,98 which prohibited any bulk collection of Americans’ calling
records by the NSA.99 The Act initiated a new telephone metadata
program in which companies would store metadata and NSA
analysts could query the information under prescribed legal
conditions.100 This new program added more transparency to the
secret FISA court. The National Security Agency Civil Liberties
and Privacy Office was obliged to submit a transparency report on
the implementation of the Act, which they released for the first
time on January 15, 2016.101
Ultimately, the need to secure government access to
information that resides on private facilities invoked a legal
response. Both the executive branch and the legislature
responded by implementing various forms of regulation under the
rule of law. Yet, the growing need to ensure ongoing access to
bulk data held by online intermediaries required some level of
participation by the online intermediaries that control this
data. To address this challenge, governance by proxy emerged.
B.

The New Form of Governance Through Public Private
Partnerships

In 2013, Edward Snowden verified the existence of an
informal collaboration between the government and online
intermediaries—the invisible handshake.102 The Snowden
revelations made the new type of PPP visible, at least to some
extent. The public learned that the private sector transferred
various forms of information to governmental agents.103 Based
on information that was made available, the public learned that
the NSA collected cyber intelligence104 (metadata and electronic
See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 812 (2d Cir. 2015).
See USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015).
99 Id. § 201. For an analysis of the USA FREEDOM Act, see Bart Forsyth,
Banning Bulk: Passage of the USA FREEDOM Act and Ending Bulk Collection, 72 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1307, 1321–40 (2015); Erin Kelly, Senate Approves USA FREEDOM Act,
USA TODAY (June 2, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/06/02/
patriot-act-usa-freedom-act-senate-vote/28345747 [https://perma.cc/689P-LYV8].
100 See USA FREEDOM Act of 2015 §§ 101, 103.
101 See Aisha Chowdhry, What’s Missing in the New NSA Report?, FCW (Jan. 15,
2016), https://fcw.com/articles/2016/01/15/nsa-privacy-chowdhry.aspx [https://perma.cc/2X
3G-WVGE].
102 See infra note 105.
103 See Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 36, at 1084 (arguing that
information flows from private companies to the government).
104 See generally ROLLINS & LIU, supra note 78.
97

98
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communications) via online intermediaries through two subprograms: PRISM and upstream collection.105 The NSA also
conducted other external programs that usually depended on
global partnerships with other intelligence agencies and perhaps
with other forms of surveillance.106 In some instances, law
enforcement officials installed devices at online intermediaries’
hosting facilities to locate information (e.g., e-mail traffic).107
Additionally, several private sector entities had contracts with the
government, allowing the government to acquire databases of
personal information.108 Snowden’s leaked documents suggested
that nine Internet companies were specifically involved in a

105 Data received from all of NSA programs is stored and remains searchable
by NSA agents using various software, e.g., XKeyscore. See Glenn Greenwald,
XKeyscore: NSA Tool Collects ‘Nearly Everything a User Does on the Internet,’
GUARDIAN (July 31, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/31/nsa-topsecret-program-online-data [https://perma.cc/363C-KE6G]. According to Snowden,
XKeyscore grants NSA analysts the ability to search through an entire database of
information, even “real-time” interception of an individual’s Internet activity, which
was obtained through various methods. Id. As Snowden claimed in his first video
interview after his revelations: “‘I, sitting at my desk’ . . . could ‘wiretap anyone, from
you or your accountant, to a federal judge or even the president, if I had a personal
email.’” See Laura Poitras & Glenn Greenwald, NSA Whistleblower Edward Snowden: ‘I
Don’t Want to Live in a Society that Does These Sort of Things’—Video, GUARDIAN (June
9, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/video/2013/jun/09/nsa-whistleblower-edwardsnowden-interview-video [https://perma.cc/WHT4-79MQ]. Thus, under this revelation,
the NSA obtained information without court orders, outside of FISA, although the NSA is
required to obtain an individualized warrant for the targeting of U.S. persons. Greenwald,
supra. Snowden’s revelations show that the NSA intercepts the communications of U.S.
persons without a warrant or court order. See id.
106 Intelligence
agencies may have gathered information obtained by
Smartphone applications. As reported by the Guardian, the NSA and its UK
counterpart GCHQ took advantage of “leaky” smartphone applications such as the
Angry Birds game made by Rovio Entertainment Ltd. James Ball, Angry Birds and
‘Leaky’ Phone Apps Targeted by NSA and GCHQ for User Data, GUARDIAN (Jan. 28,
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/27/nsa-gchq-smartphone-app-angry-bird
s-personal-data [https://perma.cc/Q6JR-RNTR]. However, the leaked documents did not
disclose the method with which the intelligence agencies are obtaining this information, nor
how many users may be affected. Id. Saara Bergström, Rovio’s VP of marketing and
communications, denied knowledge of such programs: “Rovio doesn’t have any previous
knowledge of this matter, and h[as] not been aware of such activity in 3rd party advertising
networks . . . . Nor do we have any involvement with the organizations you mentioned.” Id.
Hence, it is difficult to assess the public-private partnership in this matter.
107 See generally E. Judson Jennings, Carnivore: U.S. Government Surveillance
of Internet Transmissions, 6 VA. J.L. & TECH. 10 (2001) (summarizing the FBI’s Carnivore
project which enables agents to utilize technology to intercept, filter, seize, and decipher
digital communications on the Internet); Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 36, at 1098–
99 (summarizing the various methods in which the government uses information
obtained by online intermediaries).
108 See Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 36, at 1095–96 (giving ChoicePoint
as an example of a private sector company that has contracts with federal agencies)
(citing Glenn R. Simpson, Big Brother-in-Law: If the FBI Hopes to Get the Goods on
You, It May Ask ChoicePoint, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2001, at A1).
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surveillance program termed PRISM: Microsoft, Yahoo!, Google,
Facebook, Paltalk, AOL, Skype, YouTube, and Apple.109
The revealed NSA practices demonstrate how PPPs,
despite their benefits, could endanger the rule of law and civil
liberties, mainly due to the legal twilight zone in which they
operate. The fact that the existence of PPPs is no longer secret
might affect the nature of the PPP relationship. It could generate
consumer pressure on online intermediaries to abandon such
practices.110 Yet the invisible handshake was not only simply
“invisible” in the sense that it was kept secret; it was also
“invisible” to the law. Online intermediaries, as profit-maximizing
market players, are generally free to run their privately owned
facilitates and voluntarily share information at their discretion,
subject to regulatory restrictions and contractual obligations to
their users.111 Similarly, PPPs may also escape constitutional
restraints so long as no governmental powers are exercised.
PPPs in the United States—in terms of voluntary
disclosure of information—are not entirely new. They existed at
least as early as the 1970s with the formation of the NSA’s
Special Source Operations (SSO) division.112 At that time, over
one hundred trusted U.S. companies cooperated with the SSO.113
Long before the 9/11 attacks, and more importantly, outside the
scope of FISA or a Presidential order, the NSA sought
partnerships with private companies.114 According to the New
York Times, nearly seven months before the 9/11 attacks, the
NSA asked Qwest Communications for customers’ call records,

109 See Greenwald & MacAskill, supra note 8. For skepticism on the involvement
of the nine companies in PRISM, see Timothy B. Lee, Here’s Everything We Know About
PRISM to Date, WASH. POST (June 12, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/
wp/2013/06/12/heres-everything-we-know-about-prism-to-date [https://perma.cc/UKS9-SVB
A] (“It’s hard to be sure, but the number of companies that have issued denials, and the
vehemence of some of their statements, suggests that they may be sincere.”).
110 For a discussion on how market forces failed to reshape the nature of such
PPP, see infra Section IV.A.
111 See infra Part III.
112 See Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data
from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-usinternet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970cc
b04497_story.html [https://perma.cc/G9DS-NKSD].
113 Id.
114 Scott Shane, Former Phone Chief Says Spy Agency Sought Surveillance
Help Before 9/11, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/14/
business/14qwest.html?ref=%20todayspaper&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3HFJ-GD96].
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without a warrant.115 Similar accusations were made regarding
AT&T as part of a court filing.116
Generally, the 9/11 attacks changed the nature of the
invisible handshake. Although some companies collaborated with
the government prior to the 9/11 attacks, other companies refused
to furnish information without a warrant.117 After 9/11, due both
to patriotism and the new legal regime, which granted immunity
for voluntary collaboration, more private companies collaborated
with the government.118
The incentives for the government to form such PPPs
are obvious; data held by online intermediaries could extend
well beyond any intelligence information gathering. For one
thing, individuals are more likely to provide personal information
to a private entity.119 Although the government already collects
massive amounts of data directly from individuals,120 such
information sharing with the private sector is more frequent and
broad.121 Furthermore, private companies face fewer restrictions
on data mining.122 Thus, it is not surprising that the NSA wishes
to obtain such information, indeed, the NSA can obtain similar
data by seeking a warrant. Yet voluntary disclosure of
information could not only make it easier for the NSA to obtain
the data, but may also enable access to larger amounts of
information,123 even in “real time.”
There are two known types of voluntary disclosure of
information between the government and private companies.
One type of disclosure involves the active participation of
Id.
Andrew Harris, Spy Agency Sought U.S. Call Records Before 9/11, Lawyers
Say, 911TRUTH.ORG (July 12, 2006), http://www.911truth.org/spy-agency-sought-u-s-callrecords-before-911-lawyers-say/ [https://perma.cc/4HC7-RF5Z].
117 For such examples, see Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 36, at 1097 (listing
bookstore’s records and Amazon.com information which were not disclosed to governmental
agencies).
118 Id. at 1096–97.
119 Michaels, supra note 53, at 908 (“People simply do not interface with the
government in the same ways or with the same frequency as they do with the private
sector, and thus the intelligence agencies find themselves particularly drawn to, and in
some respects dependent upon, private data resources.”).
120 For more on the wide variety of methods the U.S. government uses to obtain
personal information directly, see Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for a
Legal Framework, 43 HARV. CIV. RTS.-CIV. LIBERTIES. L. REV. 435, 439–51 (2008).
121 See Michaels, supra note 53, at 908.
122 Id. (“[P]rivate data gathering is subject to less stringent regulation than what
the government faces.”).
123 Voluntary programs to aid the government in detecting and preventing
terrorist attacks extend far beyond the traditional PPP. For example, in the wake of 9/11,
the Justice Department developed a nationwide program “giving millions of American
truckers, letter carriers, train conductors, ship captains, utility employees, and others a
formal way to report suspicious terrorist activity.” Jon D. Michaels, Deputizing Homeland
Security, 88 TEX. L. REV 1435, 1444–46 (2010).
115
116

126

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1

private companies, which grants the government access to
information and metadata beyond the legal requirements. Put
simply, Internet companies hand out information without any
legal obligation to do so.124 The other type of voluntary disclosure
occurs when online intermediaries enable interception of their
systems, intentionally introduce backdoors into their systems,
or allow the government to directly tap into their services.125
The public became aware of the following two methods of
disclosure due to Snowden’s revelations.
The first method of voluntary disclosure of data was
conducted under a program code-named PRISM (a computer
system) through which the NSA allegedly collected data directly
from the central servers of nine U.S. Internet companies. The
NSA allegedly extracted audio and video chats, photographs, emails, documents, and connection logs of non-U.S. persons outside
the United States.126 Presumably, companies granted the NSA
access to their servers, and effectively handed over information.127
PRISM was arguably governed by section 702 of FISA.128
In the second method, designed to fill gaps in the
information collected under PRISM,129 the NSA used upstream
collection,130 which is the gathering of electronic communications
on fiber networks and infrastructure (the Internet backbone).131
See infra notes 126–128.
“[B]ackdoor[s] [are] . . . intentional flaw[s] in a cryptographic algorithm or
implementation, . . . allow[ing] . . . bypass[ing] of security mechanisms.” Nick Sullivan,
How the NSA (May Have) Put a Backdoor in RSA’s Cryptography: A Technical Primer,
ARSTECHNICA (Jan. 5, 2014), http://arstechnica.com/security/2014/01/how-the-nsa-mayhave-put-a-backdoor-in-rsas-cryptography-a-technical-primer [https://perma.cc/3PE4-A6
QR]. It is like a secret tunnel in an almost unbreakable wall. Id.
126 See Gellman & Poitras, supra note 112; Greenwald & MacAskill, supra note 8.
127 In addition to Snowden’s revelation on PRISM, USA Today reported that
the major U.S. telecommunications companies (AT&T, Verizon, and BellSouth) turned
over their “call-detail records” (metadata) to the NSA since 9/11, in a secret deal. See
Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY
(Nov. 5, 2006), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm
[https://perma.cc/XE4A-8SLP]; Susan Page, Lawmakers: NSA Database Incomplete, USA
TODAY (June 30, 2006), http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-06-30-nsa_x.htm
[https://perma.cc/A6M9-2A7U]. However, after BellSouth and Verizon denied their
involvement, and demanded that newspaper to retract the report, USA Today withdrew
the story as it applied to them. Stephen Manuel Wolfson, Note, The NSA, AT&T, and the
Secrets of Room 641A, 3 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 411, 413 (2007–2008) (describing
USA Today’s news articles).
128 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012); ROLLINS & LIU, supra note 78, at 3.
129 As later revealed, the vast majority of communications obtained under
section 702 are from online intermediaries and not upstream collection. ROLLINS & LIU,
supra note 78, at 4; see generally Memorandum Opinion at *9, 2011 WL 10945618 (FISA
Ct. Oct. 3, 2011).
130 Upstream collection is defined as “acquisition while Internet traffic is in
transit from one unspecified location to another.” ROLLINS & LIU, supra note 78, at 4.
131 See NSA Slides Explain the PRISM Data-Collection Program, WASH. POST
(June 6, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/prism-collection-docu
ments [https://perma.cc/X58K-FYSX].
124
125
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The information collected under this method included the
metadata and content of foreign targets overseas whose
communications flowed through American networks. Upstream
collection was first revealed back in 2006, during an Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF) class action lawsuit against AT&T.132
In his statement, Mark Klein, a former AT&T technician,
reported that AT&T used a “splitter” device to make a complete
copy of the Internet traffic that AT&T received, and then divert
it onto a separate fiber-optic cable connected to a room controlled
by the NSA.133 At that same time, lawsuits were filed against
other telecommunications companies on similar grounds.134
Eventually, the telecommunications companies and the
government were awarded retroactive immunity from liability
under the FAA,135 and the cases were dismissed.136 The FAA made
it clear: until 2008, there was a warrantless partnership between
major U.S. telecommunications companies and the NSA.
Currently, upstream collection is arguably legal under section 702
of FISA and Executive Order 12,333.137
The new challenges to governance also take the form of
global partnerships. Along with the two known “internal”
programs, the NSA also cooperates with other intelligence
agencies overseas, and conducts various surveillance programs.
One example of such program is MUSCULAR—a surveillance
project operated by the NSA and the British Government
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ). This project operates
in Britain and exploits data gathered from links between
Yahoo!’s and Google’s data centers, “including both metadata
Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
See Wiretap Whistle-Blower’s Account, WIRED (Apr. 7, 2006), http:// archive.
wired.com/science/discoveries/news/2006/04/70621 [https://perma.cc/TL78-XXD2]; AT&T’s
Role in Dragnet Surveillance of Millions of Its Customers, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/presskit/ATT_onepager.pdf [https://perma.cc/G7CKY42W]. The report was complemented by an expert opinion by J. Scott Marcus. See
Declaration of J. Scott Marcus in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. C-06-0672-VRW).
134 These lawsuits “were combined into a multi-district litigation proceeding
named In re NSA.” See Hepting v. AT&T, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/
cases/hepting [https://perma.cc/662U-4682].
135 In 2008, Congress added section 702 to FISA, and thereby created immunity
for telecommunications companies that aided the government during the period beginning
on September 11, 2001, and ending on January 17, 2007. See FISA Amendments Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 201, 122 Stat. 2436, 2468–70 (2008) (codified at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1885(a) (2012)) (adding § 802 to FISA). Under this section, the Attorney General can file a
certification in a lawsuit for such immunity, and the court can dismiss the case against the
telecommunications company. See 50 U.S.C. § 1885a (2012).
136 See supra note 134.
137 See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a; Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. pt. 1 (1981); Peter
Margulies, The NSA in Global Perspective: Surveillance, Human Rights, and International
Counterterrorism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 2140–42 (2014).
132

133
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and content like audio, video[,] and text.”138 On the American
side, this program runs under Executive Order 12,333.139
Briefly after Snowden’s revelations, the companies
linked to PRISM, upstream collection, and global data collection
partnerships denied their involvement, suggesting that they
would only turn over information in the face of legitimate,
specific requests to do so.140 The Final Report of the Review
138 See Mark Jaycox, Three Leaks, Three Weeks, and What We’ve Learned About
the US Government’s Other Spying Authority: Executive Order 12333, ELEC. FRONTIER
FOUND. (Nov. 5, 2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/10/three-leaks-three-weeksand-what-weve-learned-about-governments-other-spying [https://perma.cc/5U7S-ZSSQ];
Barton Gellman & Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data Centers
Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2013), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-datacenters-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d
714ca4dd_story.html [https://perma.cc/22PT-RC38].
139 See Jaycox, supra note 138.
140 Specifically, Google announced:

We disclose user data to government in accordance with the law, and we
review all such requests carefully. From time to time, people allege that we
have created a government ‘back door’ into our systems, but Google does not
have a ‘back door’ for the government to access private user data.
Dominic Rushe & James Ball, PRISM Scandal: Tech Giants Flatly Deny Allowing NSA
Direct Access to Servers, GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2
013/jun/07/prism-tech-giants-shock-nsa-data-mining [https://perma.cc/KP6F-R8H5]. “An
Apple spokesman said: ‘We have never heard of PRISM. We do not provide any government
agency with direct access to our servers and any agency requesting customer data must get
a court order.’” Id. Facebook’s chief security officer, Joe Sullivan “said it did not provide
government organisation with direct access to Facebook servers. ‘When Facebook is asked
for data or information about specific individuals, we carefully scrutinise any such request
for compliance with all applicable laws, and provide information only to the extent required
by law.’” Id. Microsoft said:
We provide customer data only when we receive a legally binding order or
subpoena to do so, and never on a voluntary basis. In addition we only ever
comply with orders for requests about specific accounts or identifiers. If the
government has a broader voluntary national security program to gather
customer data we don’t participate in it.
Id. A Yahoo! spokesman said: “Yahoo! takes users’ privacy very seriously . . . . We do
not provide the government with direct access to our servers, systems, or network.”
Gellman & Poitras, supra note 112. Other media reports insisted that the Guardian
and Washington Post reports were “incorrect and appear to be based on a misreading of
a leaked PowerPoint document.” Declan McCullagh, No Evidence of NSA’s ‘Direct
Access’ to Tech Companies, CNET (June 7, 2013), http://www.cnet.com/news/no-evidenceof-nsas-direct-access-to-tech-companies [https://perma.cc/K8D3-DUF9]. Hence, under this
argument, the NSA “has not obtained direct access to the systems of Apple, Google,
Facebook, and other major Internet companies.” Id. However, NSA’s General Counsel
Rajesh De admitted that the companies knew about the NSA’s collection of data under
both PRISM and some unnamed “upstream” collections on the communications links. See
Spencer Ackerman, US Tech Giants Knew of NSA Data Collection, Agency’s Top Lawyer
Insists, GUARDIAN (Mar. 19, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/19/us-techgiants-knew-nsa-data-collection-rajesh-de [https://perma.cc/2FBZ-22JF]; see also Greenwald
& MacAskill, supra note 8; Rushe & Ball, supra note 140; Bruce Schneier, Don’t Listen to
Google and Facebook: The Public-Private Surveillance Partnership Is Still Going Strong,
THE ATL. (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/03/don-tlisten-to-google-and-facebook-the-public-private-surveillance-partnership-is-still-going-
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Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies—a
review group formed by the DNI following Snowden’s
revelations—argued that, after reviewing the allegations that the
government had intentionally introduced “backdoors” into
commercially available software, they were “unaware of any
vulnerability created by the US Government in generally
available commercial software that put[s] users at risk of criminal
hackers or foreign governments decrypting their data.”141
Moreover, they concluded that “in the vast majority of generally
used, commercially available encryption software, there [was] no
vulnerability, or ‘backdoor,’ that ma[de] it possible for the US
Government or anyone else to achieve unauthorized access.”142
Due to the secrecy of the alleged PPP that Snowden
revealed—and because there was no admission of such PPP by
any of the nine Internet companies—it could not be completely
certain whether and to what extent companies voluntarily
shared information with the government under PRISM. What
is evident, however, is that many U.S. service providers did not
encrypt parts of their services, which allowed, intentionally or
not, government agencies to collect this data rather easily.143
Yahoo!, for example, did not encrypt their Internet users’
connections by default, which allowed the NSA to collect e-mail
address books and “buddy” lists.144 Only after the PRISM
revelations, on the same day to be exact, Yahoo! announced that
they would enable SSL encryption by default for users logging
into its web-based mail service.145 A few months after Snowden’s

strong/284612 [https://perma.cc/U75P-HHMZ]; Google Statement on NSA Infiltration of
Links Between Data Centers, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/national-security/google-statement-on-nsa-infiltration-of-links-between-data-ce
nters/2013/10/30/75f3314a-41b3-11e3-a624-41d661b0bb78_story.html [https://perma.cc/Q
Q7F-SA9C].
141 See CLARKE ET AL., supra note 20, at 217.
142 Id.
143 See Bruce Schneier, A Fraying of the Public/Private Surveillance
Partnership, THE ATL. (Nov. 8 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/20
13/11/a-fraying-of-the-public-private-surveillance-partnership/281289 [https://perma.cc/
D5W5-2YYU].
144 The Yahoo! buddy list contains the names and contact information for all of
the user’s friends which were contacted using the Yahoo! service. See Shannon Cotton,
How to View My Yahoo! Instant Messenger Buddy List, TECHWALLA, https://www.techwalla.
com/articles/how-to-view-my-yahoo-instant-messenger-buddy-list [https://perma.cc/H87BVBRP].
145 Andrea Peterson et al., Yahoo to Make SSL Encryption the Default for
Webmail Users. Finally., WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/10/14/yahoo-to-make-ssl-encryption-the-default-for-webmailusers-finally [https://perma.cc/3QFR-QHNW].

130

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1

revelations, Google announced that its mail service, Gmail,
would (now) be more secure from government spying.146
Primarily in light of Snowden’s revelations, both the
executive branch and Congress sought to officially legalize and
encourage PPPs. In February 2015, President Barack Obama
signed an executive order that “urge[d] companies to share
cybersecurity-threat information” with the federal government
and with other companies.147 The Executive Order, “advisory in
nature, . . . encourage[d]
the
development
of
central
clearinghouses for companies and the government to share
data.”148 Moreover, it encouraged the creation of data sharing
centers across specific geographic regions.149
In mid-December 2015, President Obama signed the
Omnibus Appropriations Act, which included a provision titled
the Cybersecurity Act of 2015.150 The first chapter of the
Cybersecurity Act is a rendition of a highly controversial bill
called the Cyber Information Sharing Act (CISA).151 For
cybersecurity purposes, the Cybersecurity Act authorizes private
entities to monitor their information systems, operate defensive
measures, and share “cyber threat indicators” or “defensive
measures” for a cybersecurity purpose.152 Essentially, the Act
regulates information sharing between private entities and the
government on vague and loose terms.
The importance of the Cybersecurity Act, and the new
Executive Order on PPPs, is vast. It is not surprising that these
actions occurred after Snowden’s revelations. When the
handshake was “invisible,” there was no need for such acts

146 See Chris Welch, Google Encrypts Gmail Between Data Centers to Keep the
NSA Out of Your Inbox, THE VERGE (Mar. 20, 2014), http:// www. theverge. com/2014/3/2
0/5530072/google-encrypts-gmail-between-data-centers-to-keep-out-nsa [https:// perma.
cc/K3CT-VXLE].
147 Katie Zezima, Obama Signs Executive Order on Sharing Cybersecurity
Threat Information, WASH. POST (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
post-politics/wp/2015/02/12/obama-to-sign-executive-order-on-cybersecurity threats/?tid=s
m_tw [https://perma.cc/45ET-YPJQ] (emphasis added).
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129
Stat. 2242 (2016).
151 See Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, S. 754, 114th Cong. (2015)
(enacted). For criticism on previous versions of CISA, see for example, Sam Thielman,
Controversial Cybersecurity Bill on Hold as Experts Charge It Won’t Stop Hackers,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/05/cybersecuritycisa-bill-hackers-privacy-surveillance [https://perma.cc/R9AU-2LMV]; Eldar Haber, The
Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA), CYBER BLOG (Aug. 7, 2015, 7:27 PM), http://
weblaw.haifa.ac.il/he/Research/ResearchCenters/cyberforum/cyberblog/Lists/Posts/Post.
aspx?ID=20 [https://perma.cc/MX4Y-5M2Q].
152 See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 § 104.
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because most companies cooperated with the government.153 As
these companies now feared alienating their costumers, they
sought some form of transparency. Some companies, like Apple,
began to publicly oppose aiding governmental agencies even
after receiving a court order.154 The state further attempted to
aid those companies in reducing the probability of alienating
their customers through public statements made by the President
during a press conference that explained the importance of
PPPs,155 while emphasizing the crucial role of the industry in
national security protection. The now-visible PPPs seek approval
from citizens in order to eliminate any potential barriers to
private sector cooperation, which were caused mainly by
Snowden’s revelations.
As this part shows, over the past two decades,
governments have adjusted their strategies for governing the
digital environment, using online intermediaries in innovative
ways. Yet, the social institutions that sought to secure the rule of
law and civil liberties fell short of addressing this informal PPP.
Part III addresses these legal gaps.
III.

SECURING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE INVISIBLE
HANDSHAKE

Whether FISA or the Executive Order are constitutional
is debatable,156 and beyond the scope of this article.157 This part
See infra note 233.
See infra note 248. However, it should be noted that Apple, while allegedly
involved in PRISM, does not necessarily represent every online intermediary as their
business model relies less on information, and therefore their concern in this matter
relies on protecting their products and keeping their customers. For more information
on Apple’s current business model, see Jitender Miglani, How Apple Makes Money?
Understanding Apple Business Strategy, R&P (Jan. 1, 2016), http://revenuesandprofits.
com/how-apple-makes-money [https://perma.cc/Z6RW-WUC7].
155 “There’s only one way to defend America from these cyber threats, and that
is through government and industry working together, sharing appropriate information
as true partners.” See Zezima, supra note 147 (quoting President Obama’s speech at the
first White House Summit on Cybersecurity and Consumer Protection held at Stanford
University).
156 Any Act, e.g., FISA, must be held to not violate constitutional rights for its
validity. Executive Order 12,333 restricts intelligence collection not consistent with the
Constitution. See generally Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. pt. 2.1 (1981).
157 Many scholars criticized FISA as unconstitutional or the NSA programs as
violating the statutory language of FISA. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata
Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 757
(2014); Patrick Walsh, Stepping On (or Over) the Constitution’s Line: Evaluating FISA
Section 702 in a World of Changing “Reasonableness” Under the Fourth Amendment, 18
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 741 (2015); John Yoo, The Legality of the National Security
Agency’s Bulk Data Surveillance Programs, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 901 (2014). In
addition, the Supreme Court ruled that wide-sweeping surveillance could also result in a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, as it could involve
monitoring individuals on the basis of their race or ethnicity. For this argument, see
153

154

132

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1

focuses on how the informal partnership between government
and online intermediaries affects civil liberties. Civil liberties
are generally secured by constitutional safeguards, yet private
companies are not subject to constitutional barriers.158 If
governments can easily bypass constitutional restraints by coopting the private sector, are civil liberties sufficiently secured?
This legal inquiry is further divided into the constitutional
aspects of the invisible handshake and the statutory framework
within which it operates.
A.

Constitutional Aspects

The Constitution generally protects individuals from the
state.159 This “state-citizen” dimension can be characterized as
the governmental paradigm.160 The invisible handshake,
however, presents a more complex relationship: state-online
intermediaries, and, online intermediaries-citizen.161 The
Constitution may apply to the state-online intermediaries’
relationship,162 however, the Constitution does not generally play
a role in the online intermediaries-citizen relationship, unless
online intermediaries are deemed state actors. Otherwise,
citizens’ relationships with online intermediaries are governed
by private law.163 Does the voluntary nature of the invisible
handshake mandate treating online intermediaries as state
actors that are governed by the Constitution? And if so, which
constitutional concerns would be triggered?
The invisible handshake clearly raises a series of
constitutional concerns.164 When the government acquires
Cindy C. Unegbu, Comment, National Security Surveillance on the Basis of Race,
Ethnicity, and Religion: A Constitutional Misstep, 57 HOW. L.J. 433 (2013). Until now,
one federal court has held that one of the NSA programs violated the Fourth Amendment.
See Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013). Other courts held that section
702 does not violate the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Hasbajrami v. United States, Nos.
13-CV-685, 11-CR-623, 2014 WL 4954596 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2014); United States v.
Mohamud, No. 3:10-CR-00475-KI-1, 2014 WL 2866749 (D. Or. June 24, 2014); United
States v. Muhtorov, No. 1:12-cr-00033-JLK, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61756 (D. Colo. Apr.
30, 2013).
158 See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 49–50.
159 Id. at 48–49.
160 Id. at 49–50 (coining the term “Governmental Paradigm”).
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 See id. at 51–53.
164 Beyond the reasons listed in this part, there is another potential claim solely
against the NSA. The NSA’s actions could be in violation of the Administrative Procedures
Act (APA). See 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1) (2012). Under the APA, any person who suffered a “legal
wrong” due to agency action, or was adversely affected or aggrieved by such action, shall be
entitled to judicial review. Id. § 702. This provision requires an “agency action,” defined as
“the whole or a part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or
denial thereof, or failure to act.” Id. § 551(13). As NSA actions seem more like a generalized
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personal information via informal channels, without judicial
review, it may potentially violate the fundamental principles of
separation of powers.165 Treating online intermediaries as state
actors triggers two main constitutional claims by citizens:
violations of their First and Fourth Amendment rights.166
The First Amendment protects against governmental
infringement of the freedom of speech and the freedom of
association (the right to belong to any lawful political party or
association).167 A government actor’s actions could violate these
rights—in this context, mainly the freedom to associate.168
Possible chilling effects on the freedom to associate could occur
under PPPs, as individuals will fear associating and expressing
political views as a member of a group. Individuals might fear
that their online activities are viewed and stored by
government agents, and therefore they might minimize their
engagement or cease their online activities altogether. Thus
far, courts have declined to apply the First Amendment to
similar cases involving state actors.169
practice, voluntary disclosure of information by a third party will most likely fall out of this
category. See ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 678–79 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing the “agency
action” definition when relating to NSA alleged conduct).
165 Warrantless wiretapping may elicit a constitutional challenge under the
Separation of Powers Doctrine. Accordingly, when a governmental agent, e.g., the NSA,
conducts warrantless wiretapping, its action is contrary to the limits imposed by
Congress. For further information on the Separation of Powers Doctrine, see for example,
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Keller, supra
note 75, at 1239–41 (examining whether the FAA violates the Separation of Powers
Doctrine). For a similar argument, see ACLU, 493 F.3d at 674.
166 Arguably, the invisible handshake may also implicate the Fifth Amendment
as the individual’s property (which information was obtained) could be deemed as
deprived without due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. In this case, Americans
are unaware of the invisible handshake, and are therefore deprived of judicial process
through which they could seek redress.
167 U.S. CONST. amend. I. For more on free association rights in light of NSA
surveillance practices, see Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in a Networked
World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance, 49 B.C. L. REV. 741 (2008)
(arguing “that the First Amendment’s freedom of association guarantees . . . provide a
proper framework for regulating relational surveillance”).
168 FISA has been challenged on First Amendment grounds a few times since its
enactment. See ACLU, 493 F.3d at 696; ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758, 767–68
(E.D. Mich. 2006); United States v. Falvey, 540 F. Supp. 1306, 1314–15 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
For a recent case on the potential violation of the freedom to associate by NSA programs,
see First Amended Complaint for Constitutional and Statutory Violations Seeking
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, First Unitarian Church of L.A. v. NSA, No. 3:13-cv03287 JSW (N.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2013). For more on NSA programs and the First
Amendment, see generally Thistle, supra note 59. For more on freedom to associate, see
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (finding a First Amendment violation for
turning over membership lists).
169 See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 821 n.12 (2d Cir. 2015) (declining to
discuss the Plaintiff-Appellant’s First Amendment claims); ACLU, 493 F.3d at 657 (“On a
straightforward reading, this claim does not implicate the First Amendment.”); Gordon v.
Warren Consol. Bd. of Educ., 706 F.2d 778, 781 n.3 (6th Cir. 1983) (noting that
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The Fourth Amendment grants people the right “to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures,” and ensures that “no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”170 The Fourth
Amendment can be violated only if a “search” is conducted.
Thus, the question is whether government actors’ actions
constitute a “search” under this provision.171
To meet the Fourth Amendment’s “search” standard a
person invoking its protection must be able to claim a
“legitimate expectation of privacy” that has been invaded by
government action.172 Two questions are usually embraced under
this inquiry: (1) whether the individual has exhibited an actual
expectation of privacy; and (2) whether that expectation is one
that society is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.”173 In the
informal PPP context, the question is whether data collected
through online intermediaries collaborating with the
government constitutes an unreasonable search. The third-party
doctrine, however, posits that there is no “legitimate expectation
of privacy” under the Fourth Amendment in the contents that
individuals disclose in commercial transactions because one
surveillance that falls under the Fourth Amendment “does not violate First Amendment
rights, even though it may be directed at communicative or associative activities”).
170 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
171 Blake Covington Norvell, The Constitution and the NSA Warrantless
Wiretapping Program: A Fourth Amendment Violation?, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH. 228, 233
(2009) (“In approaching a question of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated,
one must first determine if a ‘search,’ conducted by or on behalf of the government, has
taken place.”).
172 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
173 Id. Prior to Katz, the Supreme Court ruled in 1928 that the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to telephone conversations. See Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438 (1928). In 1979, the Supreme Court held that the installation and use of a “pen
register,” 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2012), was not a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment, and hence no warrant was required. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 746–
47 (1979). The telephone numbers that a customer dialed were not protected by the
Fourth Amendment as they were disclosed to the telephone company. Id. at 745. In
United States v. Knotts, the Supreme Court continued Katz’s ruling, holding that a person
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements from one place to another. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276, 286 (1983). In 2010, the Supreme Court held that reading text messages sent and
received on a pager the employer owned and issued to an employee could constitute a
“search” but it was reasonable and did not violate respondents’ Fourth Amendment
rights. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746 (2010); see Matthew Tokson, Automation
and the Fourth Amendment, 96 IOWA L. REV. 581, 583–84 (2011) (describing the history
prior to Katz v. United States). However, despite the Supreme Court ruling in Olmstead
and prior to Katz, Congress made wiretapping a federal crime shortly thereafter. See
Federal Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 2520, 48 Stat. 1103 (codified
at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2012)); Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
477, 492 (2006) (describing the history of privacy in wiretapping).
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has “assumed the risk” that this information might at some
point be disclosed.174 In other words, under this doctrine, there
is no Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy in information
conveyed from users to intermediaries.175
The Supreme Court recently reinvigorated the thirdparty doctrine. In United States v. Jones,176 the Court held that
a month-long Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking of a
vehicle was a trespassory intrusion upon private property that
constituted a Fourth Amendment search, mainly due to the
physical intrusion caused by attaching the GPS to the
vehicle.177 How applicable is Jones to the invisible handshake?
In Jones, when the government installed a device on the
vehicle, it “physically occupied private property.”178 Would the
Court have reached the same outcome if the government had
obtained information from a GPS that was already installed in
the vehicle and used by Jones? The Court noted that it might
reach a similar outcome if such a case presented itself.179 While
no certainty lies here, this ruling is arguably less applicable to
the invisible handshake. Jones did, however, provide some
insights to the new challenges posed by the digital
environment. In a concurrence, Justice Sotomayor opined:
[I]t may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has
no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age,
in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to
third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.180

Since Jones leaves room for interpretation, it seems that
the third-party doctrine may not be invoked in the invisible
handshake scenario. Imagine that the police did not issue a
warrant for surveillance against Jones, but instead, his phone
company voluntarily provided his GPS location. If such a case
presented itself, it might constitute a violation of the Fourth

See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442–43 (1976).
See generally Stephen E. Henderson, After United States v. Jones, After the
Fourth Amendment Third Party Doctrine, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 431 (2013).
176 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). In United States v. Jones, the
Court inquired whether the attachment of a Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking
device to an individual’s vehicle, and subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s
movements on public streets, constituted a search or seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 948.
177 Id. at 949.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 954 (“It may be that achieving the same result through electronic means,
without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the
present case does not require us to answer that question.”).
180 Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
174

175
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Amendment. Much ambiguity, however, lies within this scenario
as well.
The invisible handshake in NSA programs is far more
complex than the scenario in Jones. First, the data is not
intentionally disclosed by data subjects, nor is it proactively
collected by online intermediaries. Instead, comprehensive data
is routinely aggregated by online intermediaries as an integral
part of their operation.181 The sharing of such bulks of data,
with third parties or government agents, may not involve any
action on behalf of the government, the likely defendant in a
suit, and therefore may not be considered a search in the first
place. Another problem in applying the Fourth Amendment in
this case is that rights under the Fourth Amendment are treated
as “personal rights,” and these rights may not be asserted
vicariously.182 Thus, it is highly impractical to sue the NSA or
online intermediaries for any alleged voluntary disclosure of
information unless an individual can prove that her own
communications have been intercepted. Due to the invisible
nature of the partnership, any such attempt could be futile.
Overall, the constitutional protections are limited in
their ability to secure civil liberties under the new type of PPP.
Private entities are not subject to constitutional limits on
searches and are subject to no duty to respect free speech or other
fundamental rights. This may leave citizens without any effective
remedies against such actions. Statutory limitations on federal
laws have the potential to provide such remedies, yet these
limitations have ultimately proven insufficient thus far.
B.

Statutory Limitations

FISA was originally passed to prevent the unauthorized
domestic surveillance programs that occurred prior to its
enactment.183 FISA prohibits the government from engaging in
electronic surveillance, or using information obtained by
electronic surveillance not authorized by the law (or an express
statutory authorization).184 If the NSA conducts surveillance
SCHNEIER, supra note 46, at 14–19.
See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133–34 (1978); ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d
644, 673 (6th Cir. 2007).
183 See 123 CONG. REC. 15,222 (1977) (Statement of Senator Kennedy) (arguing
that FISA would “at long last place foreign intelligence electronic surveillance under the
rule of law”); Donohue, supra note 157, at 782 (“From the beginning, Congress made it
clear that the legislation was designed to prevent precisely the types of broad surveillance
programs and incursions into privacy . . . .”).
184 50 U.S.C. § 1809 (2012); Executive Order 12,333 permits the government to
target foreigners abroad for surveillance outside of FISA. See Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3
C.F.R. pt. 2.1 (1981).
181

182
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outside of the statutory framework, it could be deemed illegal.
While unbound by constitutional restraints, private companies
do have limitations on what they can do with the information
they control, both under U.S. law and, when operating outside
the United States, under international trade agreements.185
Congress enacted several laws to ensure the protection
of information obtained by private companies, and to govern
the usage of this information by governmental agencies. While
there are various forms of restriction,186 the most relevant here
are set by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA),187
which is divided into three titles: the Wiretap Act,188 the Stored
Communications Act,189 and the Pen Register Act.190
The ECPA regulates three types of communications:
wire, oral, and electronic.191 Under the ECPA, two permitted
exceptions for foreign intelligence surveillance activities exist:192
activities within the definition of “electronic surveillance” under
FISA193 and non-electronic surveillance involving the acquisition

185 U.S. companies could be generally obligated to various rules when
operating outside the United States, although trade agreements could provide
exceptions for such obligations. Accordingly, after Snowden’s revelations, the European
Parliament called for a “Full Review” of the data transfer agreement, which allows a
number of U.S. companies to transfer data about EU citizens to the United States. See
Susan Ariel Aaronson & Rob Maxim, Data Protection and Digital Trade in the Wake of
the NSA Revelations, 48 INTERECONOMICS 281 (2013) (discussing data protection in the
wake of the NSA revelations).
186 For example, following the Supreme Court Decision in United States v.
Miller, Congress passed the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 which provided
“modest statutory protection for customer financial records held by financial institutions.”
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST
TERRORISTS: A FRAMEWORK FOR PROGRAM ASSESSMENT 32 (2008); see Right to Financial
Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3641 (1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–
3422 (2012)).
187 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat.
1848 (1986). The ECPA amended Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3711 (2012)).
188 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–
2522 (2012).
189 Stored Communications Act, tit. II, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2012).
190 Pen Register Act, ch. 206, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2012).
191 For more on the ECPA, see for example, Daniel J. Solove, Reconstructing
Electronic Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1264, 1278–89 (2004).
192 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (2012).
193 Id. § 1801. “Electronic surveillance” is defined in FISA as

(1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device
of the contents of any wire or radio communication; . . . (2) the acquisition by
an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any
wire communication; . . . (3) the intentional acquisition by an electronic,
mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any radio
communication, . . . or; (4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical,
or other surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire
information, other than from a wire or radio communication.
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of foreign intelligence information from international or foreign
communications.194 This “exclusivity provision”195 applies to
surveillance conducted under FISA or of foreign communications.
But what society can learn from the NSA programs is that not all
of the NSA’s practices—including, inter alia, the public-private
partnership—fall under these exceptions. Therefore, the ECPA
applies in the context of the PPP. Both sides are subject to the
legal limitations set forth in the ECPA, and particularly, in the
Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act.
The Wiretap Act applies to real-time, in-transit
communications.196 The Wiretap Act generally prohibits
interception of “wire, oral, or electronic communication,”197 and
provides two exceptions for online intermediaries to legally assist
the government in intercepting electronic communications.198
Online intermediaries can authorize real-time interception of
electronic communications on their systems, without a court order
or certification by the Attorney General, when it is relevant to a
computer trespasser investigation. In order to qualify for this
exception, four conditions must be satisfied: (1) the online
intermediary must authorize the interception; (2) the intercepting
person must be lawfully engaged in an investigation; (3) the
intercepting person must have reasonable grounds to believe that
the contents of the computer trespasser’s communications will be
relevant to the investigation; and (4) the interception must be
confined to the communications sent or received by trespasser.199
Prior to the Cybersecurity Act,200 the disclosure of stored
information and metadata was governed primarily by the
Stored Communications Act (SCA).201 The SCA prohibits the
voluntary disclosure of customer communications or records with
some exceptions.202 The law prohibits “provider[s] of remote
computing service or electronic communication service[s]” from
knowingly divulging “a record or other information pertaining to a
Id. § 1801(f). Although companies’ voluntary disclosures of information are not
surveillance per se, they could be treated as such.
194 See LIU, supra note 70, at 2–3.
195 Id. at 2.
196 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511–2522.
197 Id. § 2511(1)(a).
198 Id. § 2511(2)(a)(ii)(A)–(B). The two exceptions include (1) “a court order
directing such assistance” or (2) where the Attorney General has provided a certification
“that no warrant or court order is required by law, that all statutory requirements have
been met, and that the specified assistance is required.” Id.
199 Id. § 2511(2)(i); Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 44–45.
200 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat.
2242 (2015) (codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1510 (2012)).
201 Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012).
202 Id. § 2702.
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subscriber to or customer of such service . . . to any governmental
entity.”203 The law provides several exceptions to this prohibition:204
Voluntary disclosure of customer communications or records is
permitted, inter alia205 (1) “with the lawful consent of the customer
or subscriber”; (2) to a law enforcement agency if the contents were
inadvertently obtained by the service provider and appear to
pertain to the commission of a crime; and (3) “to a governmental
entity, if the provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency
involving danger of death or serious physical injury to any person
requires disclosure without delay of [communications/]information
relating to the emergency.”206 Each of the relevant exceptions
should be scrutinized separately.
The first exception is the consent of the customer or
subscriber. Contract law governs the relationship between
companies and their customers or subscribers. Usually, when
an individual signs up for a service or visits a website, he is
bound to an agreement with the provider of the service.207 Such
an agreement could enable its owner to use customer
information and transfer it to any third party, at any time.
This is not far from the current reality for many online
services. Some companies explicitly indicate their prerogative
to use any data obtained from their customers. For example,
Microsoft’s policy, which applies to the e-mail services of
Hotmail, is to disclose information (including e-mail contents)
only (1) to comply with the law; (2) to protect the rights or
property of Microsoft or their customers; or (3) to an act on a
good faith belief that such access or disclosure is necessary to
protect the personal safety of Microsoft employees, customers or
the public.208 Thus, Microsoft can disclose information to the
government at its own discretion, especially if law enforcement
agencies request the information due to national security
concerns grounded in, inter alia, the protection of the public.
Contracts, however, fall short in addressing the threats of
public-private collaboration in surveillance to the civil liberties of
Id. § 2702(a)(3) (emphasis added).
Id. § 2702(b)–(c).
205 Unlike voluntary disclosure, in the case of an order requiring disclosure of
customer communications or records, the government needs either to obtain a warrant,
present an administrative or grand jury subpoena (with notice to the subscriber), or obtain a
court order for disclosure (with notice to the subscriber). See id. § 2703(a)–(b).
206 See id. § 2702(b)–(c).
207 See, e.g., Ed Bayley, The Clicks That Bind: Ways Users “Agree” to Online
Terms of Service, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 16, 2009), https://www.eff.org/
files/2016/03/15/eff-terms-of-service-whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4CP-SV8H].
208 Microsoft Online Privacy Statement, MICROSOFT, https://privacy. microsoft.
com/en-us/privacystatement [https://perma.cc/J8GD-V4ZA]; Solove, Digital Dossiers,
supra note 36, at 1099.
203
204
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users of online intermediaries. For one thing, many individuals do
not really have a choice. If they wish to partake in society, they
must “plug in.”209 Users must subscribe to an Internet Service
Provider, open accounts with cable companies, phone services,
and e-mail providers, and use search engines and social media.210
Furthermore the available mechanisms for delivering notices and
acquiring users’ consent, such as click-through or browse-wrap
consent, do not reflect a meaningful choice by end-users who are
either unaware of their consent or do not understand the terms of
these contracts.211 Therefore, these contracts fail to signal real
preferences of users, which are essential for the market to evolve
efficiently.212 These are often contracts of adhesion that, even
though enforceable, rest on a rather shaky legal basis.213
Moreover, although the law might restrict the company’s
ability to transfer its customer’s data to the government,214 it does
not forbid the selling of this information to a non-governmental
agent. Such restrictions would have a negative effect on the
business models of many online intermediaries, which are mostly
based on collecting, processing, and selling data.215 Therefore, this
“fourth party” can transfer the data to the government free from
legal constraints.216
The second exception is inadvertently obtained content
that pertains to crime commission. A provider is entitled to
divulge the contents of a communication to a law enforcement
agency if the contents were obtained unintentionally and appear
to pertain to the commission of a crime.217 Generally, some
209 See Solove, Digital Dossiers, supra note 36, at 1089 (describing the
Information Age characteristics).
210 Id.
211 Margaret Jane Radin, Taking Notice Seriously: Information Delivery and
Consumer Contract Formation, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 515, 515–16 (2016).
212 See generally Robert H. Sloan & Richard Warner, Beyond Notice and
Choice: Privacy, Norms, and Consent, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 370 (2014).
213 Generally, terms of service are enforceable, even if non-negotiable.
Nonetheless, terms of service are not without limitations and could be considered
unconscionable in some cases. See Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593,
606–07 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (holding that the “Second Life” Terms of Service’s arbitration
provision was unenforceable); Andrew William Bagley, Don’t Be Evil: The Fourth
Amendment in the Age of Google, National Security, and Digital Papers and Effects, 21
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 153, 178–79 (2011); Ty Tasker & Daryn Pakcyk, Cyber-Surfing on
the High Seas of Legalese: Law and Technology of Internet Agreements, 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 79, 90–92, 115–18 (2008).
214 See supra notes 201–206.
215 Bagley, supra note 213, at 163 (“Google’s profit model is based on offering free
services to consumers in exchange for their consent to non-negotiable terms of service.”).
216 See Michaels, supra note 53, at 918, 930 (“[T]he Stored Communications Act
prohibits certain telecommunications providers from voluntarily giving information to the
government, but allows them to transfer the same information to other private entities.
Those entities, in turn, can readily sell or give the information to the government.”).
217 18 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(7) (2012).
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information obtained by online intermediaries is purposefully
gathered, and thus is not governed by this exception. Other
than that, any information which was obtained inadvertently
should at least appear to pertain to the commission of a crime.
Bulk data does not generally fall under this category. Rather, it
only applies to information regarding a specific individual whom
the government has grounds to believe has committed a crime.
Thus, sharing bulk information with the government could not
fall under this category, as only its analysis could determine
whether the content pertained to crime commission.
The third and final exception is emergency. A provider is
also entitled to divulge the contents of a communication to a
governmental entity, if he believes in good faith that “an
emergency involving danger of death or serious physical injury to
any person requires disclosure without delay of communications
relating to the emergency.”218 Whether the invisible handshake
will fall into the emergency exception, which requires an
immediate danger of death or serious physical injury, is
debatable.219 Arguably, the need to conduct ongoing surveillance is
due to the constant state of emergency caused by the threat of
terrorism. But overall, it is more likely that the emergency
exception is not designed for ongoing programs, such as the
NSA’s, but rather for specific incidents involving an immediate
danger of death or serious physical injury.220
Arguably, the Cybersecurity Act provides some clarity
on sharing some forms of information.221 Under the Act, private
entities are authorized to monitor their information systems,
operate defensive measures, and share “cyber threat indicators”
or “defensive measures” for a cybersecurity purpose.222 While the
first two components raise many concerns,223 the third element is
most relevant to PPPs. While the Act places some restrictions
on information sharing,224 it mainly forms a framework for
Id. §§ 2702(b)(8), (c)(4).
Id. §§ 2702(b)(8), (c)(4).
220 Id. § 2702(b)(8) (“[A]n emergency involving danger of death or serious
physical injury to any person . . . .”).
221 See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129
Stat. 2242 (2015) (codified at 6 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1510 (2012)).
222 Id. § 104.
223 See, e.g., Orin Kerr, How Does the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 Change the
Internet Surveillance Laws?, WASH. POST (Dec. 24, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/12/24/how-does-the-cybersecurity-act-of-2015-changethe-internet-surveillance-laws [https://perma.cc/KT2R-ZBRM] (raising concerns regarding
the Cybersecurity Act language).
224 For example, prior to information sharing, the network operator must remove
“any information not directly related to a cybersecurity threat” that the operator “knows at
the time of sharing to be personal information of a specific individual or information that
identifies a specific individual.” See Consolidated Appropriations Act § 104(d)(2)(A).
218
219

142

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1

voluntarily sharing “cyber threat” information with the
Department of Homeland Security, which can share such
information with any governmental agency, including the NSA.225
Accordingly, online intermediaries are now able to legally share a
“cyber threat indicator”226 for a “cybersecurity purpose,” and in
exchange, they are granted immunity from liability in any cause
of legal action against them and exemption from any related
requests under the Freedom of Information Act.227
Currently, there is much ambiguity regarding the
Cybersecurity Act. For example, what constitutes a cyber threat
indicator, and what is a “cybersecurity purpose”? Even with its
vagueness, it clearly relates to information regarding cyber
activities. What is also clear is that the Cybersecurity Act makes
some forms of PPPs legal and much easier to create. It removes
most obstacles for PPPs, allowing information sharing between
companies and the U.S. government. But the invisible handshake
represents more than that. It represents the sharing of bulk data,
which could relate to anything and anyone. Hence, while the
Cybersecurity Act does provide some clarity—and perhaps
mostly immunity for private entities—regarding information
sharing, it does not directly regulate the invisible handshake.
What one could argue is that the Cybersecurity Act clarifies
limitations on private companies: If they are sharing information
without a “cyber threat indicator,” then it would be illegal for
them to monitor their information systems, operate defensive
measures, and perhaps most important here, voluntarily share
information with the government. Under such an assumption, the
Cybersecurity Act effectively makes some voluntary sharing of
information illegal. Yet the triggers that authorize voluntary
information sharing—“a cyber threat indicator” or “defensive
measure”—are too broadly defined.228 Most importantly, the new
law authorizes the voluntary disclosure of information to further
Id.
The term “cyber threat indicator” is defined as “information that is necessary
to describe or identify” any of the following items or any combination of them:
225
226

malicious reconnaissance . . . ; a method of defeating a security control or
exploitation of a security vulnerability; a security vulnerability . . . ; a method of
causing a user with legitimate access to an information system or information
that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system to unwittingly
enable the defeat of a security control or exploitation of a security vulnerability;
malicious cyber command and control; the actual or potential harm caused by an
incident . . . ; [or] any other attribute of a cybersecurity threat, if disclosure of such
attribute is not otherwise prohibited by law.
Id. § 102(6).
227
228

Id. § 105(d)(3).
See id. § 102(6), (7).
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cybersecurity in general, not necessarily only the security of
online intermediaries’ own networks, but possibly also the
security of other networks.229
Snowden’s revelations forced the state to seek ways of
bringing PPPs under the rule of law. The Cybersecurity Act
reflects an attempt to legalize and incentivize information
sharing between online intermediaries and the government. Yet
the law leaves much room for interpretation by online
intermediaries in exercising their discretion. Therefore, in the
absence of judicial review, the civil rights of online users are
practically subject to the informal understandings between the
government and online intermediaries.
IV.

SOCIAL AND LEGAL INTERVENTIONS

The invisible handshake worked well for both the
government and the private sector under a veil of secrecy.230
From the government’s perspective, PPPs provide operational
flexibility and immunity from political and legal sanctions.231
Operating without any form of oversight clearly enhances any
agency’s abilities. It also benefitted online intermediaries. For
example, under such partnerships, companies could obtain
government contracts.232 Online intermediaries depend on
governments for other reasons too. For instance, the government
could decide whether the intermediaries are subject to tax and

See Kerr, supra note 223.
The identities of the government’s private partners in PRISM are considered
its most sensitive secret. Gellman & Poitras, supra note 112. As noted in a leaked NSA
report: “98 percent of PRISM production is based on Yahoo, Google and Microsoft; we
need to make sure we don’t harm these sources.” Id.
231 See Michaels, supra note 53, at 906, 922–26.
232 Many telecommunications companies have contracts with the government,
which could be financially crucial for their business models. Reports indicate that
Qwest, a major telecommunications company that refused handing warrantless
customers’ information to the NSA, was pressured by them, inter alia, by suggesting
that such action will negatively affect their chances to get future classified work with
the government, and/or by adhering to patriotism. See Cauley, supra note 127. A
former Qwest executive alleged later that the government withdrew opportunities for
contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars due to Qwest’s refusal to participate in
such PPP with the NSA. See Ellen Nakashima & Dan Eggen, Former CEO Says U.S.
Punished Phone Firm, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/w
p-dyn/content/article/2007/10/12/AR2007101202485.html [https://perma.cc/BQC5-F288].
The private sector could also use the knowledge and capabilities of the government for its
own benefit. For example, the Washington Post reported that Google sought the help of
the NSA to aid in cybersecurity measures. See Ellen Nakashima, Google to Enlist NSA to
Help It Ward Off Cyberattacks, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2010), http://www. washington
post.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/03/AR2010020304057.html [https:// perma.cc/
HJ9A-DWY3].
229
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antitrust regulation,233 or if they require a license or a franchise
to operate.234 Clouds of data, however virtual, and computing
facilities could also be considered critical infrastructure that
may depend on (physical) protection by the state.
Most importantly, there is a shared interest between
online intermediaries and governments, and the discrepancy is
narrower than often assumed. Governments are commonly
entrusted with a regulatory function to promote social welfare: to
intervene in economic activity in the case of a market failure, and
to secure civil liberties. Yet, as governments become more
dependent upon data generated by users of online intermediaries
for governance and law enforcement purposes, they develop a
stake in facilitating more collection of data.
Online intermediaries are part of the data industry. The
logic of the data industry requires maximizing exclusive control
over data. Google, Amazon, Twitter, and Facebook strive to offer
free services, innovative features, and competitive content, in
order to maximize opportunities for collecting massive amounts
of personal data.235 The logic of accumulation mandates that all
online activities be recorded and analyzed to optimize the quality
of data generated by such companies, and refine its accuracy for
advertisers.236 Therefore, the forces driving the data market are
similar to those felt by the government—in order to be effective,
both require robust and comprehensive data collection. That is
where “surveillance capitalism,” as coined by Shoshana Zuboff,237
meets the surveillance state.
The secrecy of the informal collaboration between online
intermediaries and governments serves the interest of both.
Indeed, if users fear surveillance, they will abstain from some
services, which in turn, will reduce the potential for data
233 Google and other American technology companies are currently facing many
regulatory challenges over taxation and antitrust matters. On taxation, EU officials are
currently reexamining a tax settlement with Google, the British government, and other
EU states, and is considering imposing a blockwide standard for taxation. James Kanter
& Mark Scott, Taxing Google and Other U.S. Giants Is Dividing Europe, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
28, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/29/business/international/taxing-google-andother-us-giants-is-dividing-europe.html [https://perma.cc/SCD7-PK36]. On antitrust, EU’s
antitrust chief formally charged Google of abusing its dominance in web searches. Kelly
Couturier, How Europe Is Going After Apple, Google and Other U.S. Tech Giants, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/04/13/technology/HowEurope-Is-Going-After-U.S.-Tech-Giants.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/KWR5-VGU8].
234 See Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 12, at 24–25.
235 For more on how massive amounts of personal data are being routinely
collected by companies in exchange for free services, see Claire Porter, Little Privacy in
the Age of Big Data, GUARDIAN (June 20, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2014/jun/20/little-privacy-in-the-age-of-big-data [https://perma.cc/B2TW-5V75].
236 Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of
an Information Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75, 79 (2015).
237 Id. at 77.
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collection. If users are unaware of surveillance, they are more
likely to generate data that is economically valuable to online
intermediaries and might also become useful for public safety
and national security. Moreover, the invisibility of the handshake
between the government and online intermediaries shielded the
latter from pushback by consumers. It has also legally protected
those intermediaries from lawsuits by their customers and
reduced potential vulnerability to shareholder lawsuits.238
While the mutual interests of online intermediaries and
governments under PPPs are acknowledged, what is lacking
under PPPs is the reassurance that the government is not
misusing its power.239 The existence of PPPs without any
oversight endangers democracy.240 Preserving civil liberties and
the rule of law necessitates expanding the scope of internal and
external oversight.241 That is, if the government obtains more
power, there is a need for greater restraints. Society needs some
restrictions and oversight on how data is collected and shared.
Such checks and balances could be market-based, regulatory,
or both.242

238 Jon Michaels suggests other explanations to “why a firm may agree to an
informal relationship,” for example “structural flaws in corporate decision making.” See
Michaels, supra note 53, at 926–27.
239 See Michael V. Hayden, Balancing Security and Liberty: The Challenge of
Sharing Foreign Signals Intelligence, 19 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 247,
251 (2005) (“The American people must be confident that the power they have
entrusted to NSA is not being, and will not be, abused.”).
240 Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1306, 1318 (2004) [hereinafter Swire, The System of Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Law] (listing examples of secret surveillance use against
political opponents in the United States). Generally, flow of information from the
private sector to government could impose a chilling effect on democracy. See PAUL M.
SCHWARTZ & JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW: A STUDY OF UNITED STATES
DATA PROTECTION 39 (1996) (“[T]otalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe relied on
information gathering and data storage to weaken the individual capacity for critical
reflection and to repress any social movements outside their control.”); Solove, Digital
Dossiers, supra note 36, at 1084–85 (arguing that increasing amount of personal
information flowing to the government “can result in the slow creep toward a
totalitarian state”); Peter P. Swire, Financial Privacy and the Theory of High-Tech
Government Surveillance, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 461, 471–72 (1999).
241 Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, supra note 240,
at 1340 (“To give one example, broad surveillance might be accompanied by greater
external oversight.”).
242 Jon Michaels proposed mandating corporate insistence on being served with
the requisite instruments of legal compulsion; corporate disclosures describing the nature
of the collaborations to Congress and to the inspectors general of the agencies conducting
the operations; and escalating burdens of proof that require agencies periodically to
demonstrate to the FISA court the continuing utility of ongoing operations. See Michaels,
supra note 53, at 951–65.

146

A.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:1

Social Intervention: Market-Driven Solutions

The current legal framework enables the secrecy of the
PPP. Lacking knowledge of the NSA programs, the market was
incapable of responding. Once the invisible handshake became
more visible, market forces could have played a role in restraining
PPPs. Presumably, if consumers became more involved, they
could pressure the government and companies to resort to better
practices within the existing legal framework. Private technology
companies linked to PPPs were placed in a difficult position: while
PPPs could be beneficial for them, their alleged involvement in
these practices might harm them financially.
Consumers became aware of the invisible handshake
mostly after Snowden’s revelations, which could have potentially
harmed online intermediaries by alienating their subscribers,
and subsequently jeopardizing their profits.243 Fearing such
potential alienation, which could lead to financial loss,
companies that were allegedly involved in PRISM and upstream
collection sought to distance themselves from the image of state
agents or collaborators.244 Major private technology companies
embarked on a campaign against state surveillance and the
negative impact on their customers. For example, because
companies were often prohibited from disclosing data requests
from government agencies,245 Twitter (which was not involved
243 For Cisco’s alleged financial losses linked to Snowden revelations, see
Christopher Mims, Cisco’s Disastrous Quarter Shows How NSA Spying Could Freeze US
Companies Out of a Trillion-Dollar Opportunity, QUARTZ (Nov. 13, 2013), http://qz.com/14
7313/ciscos-disastrous-quarter-shows-how-nsa-spying-could-freeze-us-companies-out-of-atrillion-dollar-opportunity [https://perma.cc/AGK7-HSBL]. For IBM’s, see Dimitra
Kessenides, IBM Shareholder Sues the Company over NSA Cooperation, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 13, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-12-13/ibmshareholder-sues-company-over-nsa-cooperation [https://perma.cc/94B8-2FVK].
244 Although the scope of possible revenue loss is unclear and could vary
among various companies, few companies made estimations of the possible financial
loss after the revelation of PRISM. For example, the Information Technology and
Innovation Foundation (ITIF) estimated that the low-end costs for the U.S. Cloud
Computing Industry could be $21.5 to $35 billion. See DANIEL CASTRO, INFO. TECH. &
INNOVATION FOUND., HOW MUCH WILL PRISM COST THE U.S. CLOUD COMPUTING
INDUSTRY? 3 (2013), http://www2.itif.org/2013-cloud-computing-costs.pdf [https://perma.
cc/8T83-BUVR]; Andrea Peterson, NSA Snooping Could Cost U.S. Tech Companies $35
Billion over Three Years, WASH. POST (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.washington
post.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/07/nsa-snooping-could-cost-u-s-tech-companies-35billion-over-three-years [https://perma.cc/NT7V-928S] (citing the ITIF report).
245 There are several types of prohibitions. First, the FBI is authorized by section
2709 of the Federal Stored Communications Act to issue NSLs to electronic communication
service providers. Such NSLs compel the recipients to disclose “subscriber information and
toll billing records information” upon a certification by the FBI that the information sought
is “relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 2709(a)–(b) (2012). The recipient of the NSL
shall not disclose “to any person (other than those to whom such disclosure is necessary to
comply with the request or an attorney to obtain legal advice or legal assistance with respect
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in PRISM) filed a lawsuit in federal court designed to enable
them to publish full transparency reports indicating the exact
number of national security letters (NSLs) and FISA court
orders received.246 Another example is that of Apple, which
released new “Legal Process Guidelines” for U.S. law enforcement
agencies,247 and has also actively opposed legislation and court
orders248 that could weaken security and enable backdoors.249
Moreover, after Snowden’s revelations, several major U.S.
technology companies formed the Global Government Surveillance
Reform (GGSR),250 which seeks to further regulate “government
surveillance of individuals and access to their information.”251 At
the same time, however, there is a growing concern that online
intermediaries are being hypocritical in this debate and are merely
paying lip service to the defense of civil liberties.252
to the request) that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained access to
information or records.” Id. § 2709(c)(1). Second, recipients of court orders are obliged to
provide the government with “all information, facilities, or technical assistance necessary to
accomplish the electronic surveillance in such a manner as will protect its secrecy.” 50
U.S.C. § 1805(c)(2)(B) (2012). In addition, unauthorized disclosures of national defense
information under certain circumstances could result in criminal sanctions, 18 U.S.C. § 793
(2012); some companies sign nondisclosure agreements, and FISC can impose such
nondisclosure obligations. For these arguments, see Twitter, Inc. v. Holder, No. 14-cv04480-YGR, 2016 WL 1729999 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2016).
246 See Twitter, 2016 WL 1729999.
247 See Legal Process Guidelines: U.S. Law Enforcement, APPLE (Sept. 29, 2015),
https://www.apple.com/legal/privacy/law-enforcement-guidelines-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/
2Q7Y-SLZM].
248 On February 16, 2016, Apple was ordered by the United States District
Court for the Central District of California to help the FBI get into the iPhone used by the
San Bernardino shooter Syed Farook. See Orin Kerr, Preliminary Thoughts on the Apple
iPhone Order in the San Bernardino Case (Part 1), WASH. POST (Feb. 18, 2016), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/18/preliminary-thoughts-o
n-the-apple-iphone-order-in-the-san-bernardino-case-part-1/?tid=a_inl [https://perma.cc/8
47S-PDBR]. The FBI needed Apple’s aid in this incident as the “auto erase” function was
turned on, meaning that if the FBI attempted to guess the passcode ten times incorrectly,
the data would be destroyed by encryption. Id. The problem was that Farook’s iPhone
used the iOS9 operating system which could not be decrypted even with a warrant. Id.
Hence, the court ordered Apple, under the All Writs Act, to create a backdoor into the
iPhone or to exploit a potential existing backdoor in their design. Id. In response, Apple
chief executive Tim Cook publicly stated that Apple intended to fight the court order. Id.
249 See for example, in the UK, Alex Hern, Apple Calls on UK Government to
Scale Back Snooper’s Charter, GUARDIAN (Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2015/dec/21/apple-uk-government-snoopers-charter-investigatory-powers-b
ill [https://perma.cc/4JCV-MMDR].
250 As of February 15, 2016, these companies include AOL, Apple, Dropbox,
Evernote, Facebook, Google, LinkedIn, Microsoft, Twitter, and Yahoo!. See Global
Government Surveillance Reform, REFORM GOV’T SURVEILLANCE, https://www.reform
governmentsurveillance.com [https://perma.cc/9LGV-RG3T].
251 Id.
252 Facebook, for example, was accused that while it had “been lauded as opposing”
the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA), which would grant it legal immunity for
information sharing with the government, its lobbyists were actually “welcoming CISA
behind closed doors.” See Cory Doctorow, Petition: Facebook Betrayed Us by Secretly
Lobbying for Cyber-Surveillance Bill, BOING BOING (Oct. 24, 2015), http://boingboing.net/201
5/10/24/petition-facebook-betrayed-us.html [https://perma.cc/ACC8-D8KF].
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Aside from these types of company reactions, there are
other possible market-driven solutions that the private sector
could deploy. Online intermediaries could actively fight against
the legality of the NSA practices or the constitutionality of the
statutes under which these programs purportedly operate.
Such a move could enhance companies’ reputations and restore
their customers’ faith. In that sense, companies could also
collaborate and fight together for more transparency.253
Online intermediaries can also play a more active role
in the FISC process, and challenge FISC decisions by filing
petitions.254 Presumably, if companies actively engaged in the
FISC process, then FISC might cease its “rubber stamping”255
of agencies’ requests, as judges might be more cautious about
issuing blank orders. This could increase transparency to some
extent, as the public could better assess whether their
information is bluntly shared with the government. But such
solution is only partial. Companies could misuse this mechanism
by objecting to FISC decisions superficially, merely for the sake of
appearance. Moreover, even if companies truly resisted FISC
decisions, the existence of other PPPs between them and the
government could remain hidden. That is, secret PPPs may still
exist under other mechanisms even while consumer trust could
potentially be restored by a belief that companies are actively
fighting against government agencies.
In addition, online intermediaries could improve
transparency of governmental practices. One way to achieve
such transparency is to publish transparency reports that
provide data on government requests. The problem, however, is
that companies are often prohibited from disclosing data
requests from government agencies.256 There are a few ways to
bypass such disclosure prohibitions, at least to some extent.
Currently, companies are permitted to disclose the number of

253 Such form of a market-driven solution was proposed by a collaboration of
various groups, under the title “Reset the Net.” RESET THE NET, https://www.resetthe
net.org [https://perma.cc/4PP5-46RD]. This initiative calls on everyone (except the NSA) to
“build[ ] proven security into the everyday Internet” and “spread NSA-resistant privacy
tools.” Id. Under this initiative, website owners will implement security protocols such as
HTTPs, HSTS, and PFS (perfect forward secrecy). Id. Mobile App developers will add SSL
and certificate pinning, including for “third party code like ad networks and analytics.” Id.
Other companies will also implement a security action plan. Id. Finally, even regular users
could promote and disseminate privacy tools. Id.
254 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
255 See infra note 289.
256 Zack Whittaker, How Tech Companies Use Warrant Canaries to Secretly
Communicate with You, ZDNET (Mar. 5, 2015), http://www.zdnet.com/article/warrantcanary [https://perma.cc/2VXL-XUEP].
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secret data demands in ranges.257 The problem is that 0 and
999 requests are treated equally.258 Companies are still
prohibited from disclosing the fact that they did not receive any
requests from law enforcement agencies.259
Interpreting speech in this context, i.e., what constitutes
disclosure of requests, led to a bypassing mechanism. Some
companies interpreted the legal framework as allowing them to
inform the public that they have not received any requests, and
companies used unique non-speech methods often referred to
as “canaries” in order to do so. For purposes of transparency,
several groups formed the Canary Watch,260 a website that
tracks, documents, and lists canaries. A warrant canary is a
“published statement that a[n] [online] service provider has not
received legal process that it would be prohibited from saying it
had received, such as a national security letter.”261 The process
is simple: when companies publish a canary, the website informs
the public. Then, the same website reports its disappearance,
from which the public can infer that the company received secret
orders from an intelligence or law enforcement agency.262
Canaries currently fall into a legal gray area and do not
necessarily align with the prohibitions set by the law.263
Canaries exemplify a market-driven solution that could
lead to higher transparency. The problem is that not all
companies use canaries. If a company initially does not inform the
public that it has not received a request from the government, the
public is unable to infer when they do. Therefore, a canary watch
requires the cooperation of private entities. Moreover, even if
some companies do list canaries, and the public notices their
disappearance, the public is still in no position to know the
content of the government’s warrant. It could be a specific
warrant, designed to locate a single communication for a short,
defined period, or it could broadly apply to the entire
communication of a company for a long period.
Finally, companies could better secure their products.
They could implement encryption technologies that would make
communication invisible and inaccessible to them. Under this
scenario, companies will not be able to turn over any information
regarding their clients, even under a court order. This solution,
Id.
Id.
259 Id.
260 See CANARY WATCH, https://canarywatch.org [https://perma.cc/F59K-E5X2].
261 Id.
262 About Canary Watch, CANARY WATCH, https://canarywatch.org/about.html
[https://perma.cc/6THJ-3MFE].
263 See Whittaker, supra note 256.
257
258
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however, is successful so long as the government does not
prohibit such strong encryption. Despite various regulatory
attempts,264 there are currently no regulatory requirements for
the method of encryption at any level. But such regulations
could arise, especially if policymakers fear that some companies
will embed strong encryption tools into their services. One
example of such fear can be traced to January 2015, in which
British Prime Minister David Cameron announced that “he would
pursue banning encrypted messaging services if Britain’s
intelligence services were not given access to the
communications.”265 Encryption, however, is not a perfect
solution. Encryption could be costly and does not necessarily align
with the revenue models of companies. They rely on unencrypted
information as part of their business models.266 Furthermore,
PPPs could still exist even with encryption, and their secrecy
could be well hidden from the public.
If private companies are truly not involved in the
government’s alleged use of “backdoors,” then they should find
better ways to secure their products. Such backdoors could
negatively affect U.S. companies in the international market, as
customers might fear that U.S. technology products are not
trustworthy.267 Cisco announced that they are now shipping
equipment to addresses unrelated to a customer, in order to
reduce the possibility of the NSA tampering with their
products.268 It is not a perfect solution, as the NSA can still use
other PPPs in the supply chain, such as DHL or FedEx, to install
backdoors in their products. But Cisco’s move still reduces the
probability that their products contain backdoors, and more

264

at 87 n.195.

For example of such attempts, see Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 12,

265 Mark Scott, British Prime Minister Suggests Banning Some Online
Messaging Apps, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2015), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/01/12/
british-prime-minister-suggests-banning-some-online-messaging-apps/?_r=0 [https://perma.
cc/G4FP-YMRW].
266 See, e.g., Peter Swire, From Real-Time Intercepts to Stored Records: Why
Encryption Drives the Government to Seek Access to the Cloud, 2 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 200,
206 (2012) (“For instance, at least some cloud providers have business models that gain
revenue based on access to unencrypted data, such as Gmail’s automatic scanning of the
content of email in order to serve targeted advertisements.”). Google’s essence is
information. The name Google is “a play on the word ‘googol’” “as a reflection of the sheer
volume of information that exists in the world.” Corporate Information, Company Overview,
GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/corporate/index.html [https://perma.cc/FY9E-DZSM];
Stephanie A. DeVos, The Google-NSA Alliance: Developing Cybersecurity Policy at
Internet Speed, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 173, 190 (2010).
267 Jeremy Kirk, To Avoid NSA, Cisco Gear Gets Delivered to Strange
Addresses, CIO (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.cio.com/article/2899854/to-avoid-nsa-ciscogear-gets-delivered-to-strange-addresses.html [https://perma.cc/S4P2-QC5Z].
268 Id.
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importantly, it signals to their customers that they are not a part
of a PPP with the NSA.269
Other market-driven solutions could arise from civil
society, that is, non-governmental organizations and institutions
that manifest the interests and will of citizens. NGOs and
individuals could, just like companies, actively fight against the
legality of NSA practices and/or challenge the constitutionality
of the statutes in court.270 They could also sue companies to force
them to reveal their practices to their consumers. Even if
companies acted lawfully, the fear of PPP exposure could change
their practices. Finally, watchdog groups could notify the public
about companies’ interactions with government actors. One
example of this is the before-mentioned Canary Watch; but there
are others. For example, the Electronic Frontier Foundation
(EFF) operates a Secure Messaging Scorecard, designed to rate
the applications that secure communications between users.271 If
a company provides an encrypted messaging service, while
another does not, end users could choose the former.
End users could also play an important role in cyber
safety. Organizations such as the EFF provide surveillance selfdefense methods on their website.272 The website includes an
online guide, currently available in three languages, to “defending
yourself and your friends from surveillance by using secure
technology and developing careful practices.”273 Self-protection in
this era might be more important than imagined. Even if the U.S.
government adopts an optimal regime, which balances national
security threats with liberties, other jurisdictions might not act
accordingly. Thus, protection from overall surveillance that relies
on state actors, or even companies and NGOs, will not suffice.
Therefore, end users should adopt email encryption technologies
such as Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)274 or GNU Privacy Guard

Id.
For an overview of litigation against the NSA surveillance programs, see
Kara Brandeisky, NSA Surveillance Lawsuit Tracker, PROPUBLICA (July 10, 2013),
http://projects.propublica.org/graphics/surveillance-suits [https://perma.cc/Y282-VW4P]
(last updated May 13, 2015).
271 See Secure Messaging Scorecard, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.
org/secure-messaging-scorecard [https://perma.cc/ZRY9-3G2X].
272 See Surveillance Self-Defense, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://ssd.eff.org
[https://perma.cc/2XSY-HRRW].
273 Id. This website is currently available in English, Arabic, and Spanish.
274 “Pretty Good Privacy or PGP is a popular program used to encrypt and decrypt
email over the Internet, as well as authenticate messages with digital signatures and
encrypted stored files.” See Margaret Rouse, Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), TECHTARGET,
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/Pretty-Good-Privacy [https://perma.cc/9
5FY-MJJX].
269
270
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(GPG),275 use anonymous browsing tools such as the TOR
network,276 or even engage in physical or digital protests.277
As history shows, there are two problems that arise from
reliance on market-driven solutions as a single check on the abuse
of power: (1) the public tends to forget, and (2) companies do not
have incentives to challenge PPPs without public pressure.
Snowden was hardly the first whistleblower who revealed NSA
programs. The public learned of other NSA programs in 2006,278
but that did not stop the NSA or the companies from
collaborating, or continuing to collaborate, after such revelations.
The post-Snowden era tells a similar story. While market forces
might have driven both the government and companies to provide
more information on the nature of their PPPs, it mainly—and
limitedly—yielded some information on the secret FISC
decisions.279 Social intervention (either via the market, or by civil
society) is, therefore, a limited tool for providing proper checks
and balances, and legal intervention by policymakers is required.
B.

Legal Intervention

The nature of distributed networks presents challenges to
the ability of the state to govern effectively. The government’s
response to this governance crisis was to acquire some control
over information flow. To achieve such control, the United States
worked—almost simultaneously—along two strategies. One
strategy was to acquire ongoing access to bulk data via informal
collaborations with online intermediaries.280 Part III showed
that this strategy created a legal twilight zone and left big holes
275 “OpenPGP software uses a combination of strong public-key and symmetric
cryptography to provide security services for electronic communications and data
storage. These services include confidentiality, key management, authentication, and
digital signatures. This document specifies the message formats used in OpenPGP.”
See Network Working Grp., OpenPGP Message Format, INTERNET ENG’G TASK FORCE
(Nov. 2007), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4880.txt [https://perma.cc/4D4T-GXV5].
276 The Onion Router (Tor) is a network connected “through a series of virtual
tunnels . . . allowing both organizations and individuals to share information over public
networks” with less surveillance risks. See Tor: Overview, TOR PROJECT, https://
www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en [https://perma.cc/7ZFX-NVCM].
277 An example of such digital protest took place on February 11, 2014, under the
title: “The Day We Fight Back.” See Jessica Mckenzie, Tomorrow the Internet Puts Collective
Foot Down to Say ‘No’ to Mass Surveillance, TECHPRESIDENT (Feb. 10, 2014), http://tech
president.com/news/24735/tomorrow-internet-puts-collective-foot-down-say-no-mass-surveill
ance [https://perma.cc/PU6W-E6QF]. In that protest, more than 5000 websites displayed a
banner that read “Dear Internet, we’re sick of complaining about the NSA. We want new
laws that curtail online surveillance.” Id. “Stop Watching Us” is another example of such
initiative. See Stop Watching Us, STOP WATCHING US, https://optin.stopwatching.us [https://
perma.cc/QUV6-M628].
278 See supra note 133.
279 See infra Section IV.B.1.
280 See supra Section II.B.
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in the legal shield meant to secure civil rights. Another strategy
for acquiring access to information flow was a regulatory
approach, whereby enforcement agencies could obtain
information from online intermediaries subject to legal oversight.
This section analyzes the limits of current regulatory tools in
safeguarding human rights and liberties.
1. Judicial Oversight
Information-gathering programs were placed under
various forms of oversight by the legislative, judicial, and
executive branches.281 Congress, the Intelligence Oversight
Board (within the Executive Office of the President), the Office
of Intelligence Policy and Review (Department of Justice), the
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight
and the Office of General Counsel (Department of Defense),
and finally the FISC are all reviewing NSA activities to some
extent.282 Under this regulatory approach, executive agencies
were placed under the supervision of the other branches: the
legislature, which attempted to craft the rules of information
gathering, and the judiciary, tasked with ruling on what
information could be divulged.283
As Snowden’s revelations showed, this regulatory
approach was flawed. Prima facie, the FISC was meant to
serve as a gatekeeper of American citizen’s liberty. But this
was hardly true. A report to Congress on FISC requests in 2012
revealed that the government filed 1,789 applications for
authority to conduct electronic surveillance.284 Only one request
was not approved, and this was due to the government’s
withdrawal.285 Between 1979 and 2012, there were 33,949
“Traditional FISA Surveillance Orders.”286 Only eleven were
rejected.287 FISC judges had almost indefinitely complied with
government agencies’ surveillance requests, and granted blank

281 See Hayden, supra note 239, at 252–54 (describing the oversight framework,
while focusing on legislative, executive, and judicial oversights).
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 See Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, to Hon. Harry Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (Apr. 30, 2013), http://
www.justice.gov/nsd/foia/foia_library/2012fisa-ltr.pdf [https://perma.cc/BE2J-EHQ6].
285 Id.
286 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Court Orders 1979–2014, ELEC.
PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/wiretap/stats/fisa_stats.html [https://perma.c
c/38MB-HL4D].
287 Id.
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orders.288 Thus, the judicial process established under FISA has
proven an inadequate safeguard of rights and liberties because
the FISC effectively rubber-stamped bulk data requests by
governmental agencies.289
One of the main deficiencies of the FISC process is tied
to its secrecy. Generally, upon receiving a FISC order, any
person may challenge the order’s legality by filing a petition.290
Due to the secrecy of FISC orders, the only “persons” eligible to
challenge FISC orders are the companies that received them.291
The problem is that online intermediaries have very little
incentive to challenge these orders,292 and therefore, only a few
288 A good example of such warrants is that of Verizon. This large American
telecommunications provider was required by a blanket order to provide metadata on
all telephone calls in its systems on an “ongoing daily basis.” In re Application of the
FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from
[Telecommunications Providers] Relating to [REDACTED], No. BR 0605 (FISA Ct. May
24, 2006). This revelation demonstrated that court orders were not always confined to
suspected individuals, or merely against non-U.S. citizens. See Glenn Greenwald, NSA
Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily, GUARDIAN (June 6,
2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-courtorder [https://perma.cc/2NCL-CZ27].
289 It should be noted that some scholars argue that the success rate of
government requests in FISC does not imply that FISC serves as a rubber stamp, but
rather, that the government only makes requests that would benefit them and that
they know FISC judges would approve. One scholar argues that this is partially due to
the high costs of filing a FISC request application (in time, resources, and reputation).
See Conor Clarke, Note, Is the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Really a Rubber
Stamp? Ex Parte Proceedings and the FISC Win Rate, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 125,
126 (2014). For more on government’s success rate in FISC proceedings, see for
example, Continued Oversight of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 49 (2013) (statement of Laura K.
Donohue, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center), http://scholarship.law.george
town.edu/cong/117 [https://perma.cc/R45G-XPUR] (arguing that the “rather remarkable
success rate” raises a “serious question about the extent to which FISC and [the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review] perform the function they were
envisioned to serve”); Theodore W. Ruger, Essay, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s
Appointments to the FISA Court: An Empirical Perspective, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 239, 245
(2007) (arguing that the “government success rate [is] unparalleled in any other
American court”).
290 50 U.S.C. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i) (2012). After filing a petition, a FISC judge
conducts an initial review within seventy-two hours. Id. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(ii). Upon ruling
on whether the petition is “not frivolous,” id., either side can seek en banc review
before the full FISC, id. § 1803(a)(2)(A), or file a petition for review with the FISA
Court of Review. Id. § 1861(f)(3). Subsequently, both sides may petition for writ of
certiorari to review such decision. Id.
291 See ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (noting that
“section 215 does not provide for any person other than a recipient of an order to
challenge the orders’ legality or otherwise participate in the process”).
292 There are many reasons why private companies would avoid challenging a
FISC order. One reason could be financial. The judicial process is expensive and compliance
could be cheaper. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 389–
90 (2004). Another reason could be that online intermediaries view Courts as agents of the
State, and their orders were closely examined to serve an important purpose. An example of
a third possible reason is the perceived chances of success. If FISC merely serves as a rubber
stamp, companies might refrain from challenging its decisions, as they might assume that
there are relatively low chances of success. Thus, these companies conduct a cost-benefit
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companies do so.293 To address the problems that arise from the
ex-parte nature of FISC decisions, Congress considered
including an independent agency to serve as a special advocacy
board in the FISC to reduce the likelihood that the FISC will
simply rubber-stamp requests.294
The main lesson to be drawn from the regulatory
approach under FISA is that courts can only play a limited role
in monitoring the exercise of power by governmental agencies
in the era of big data. The reason is that governments have
adapted strategies to address the governance crises in digital
networks. Rather than target particular suspects and pursue a
warrant for additional collection of data based on suspicion, the
current paradigm reverses the order. It involves collecting and
analysis, weighing their chances of success against the perceived (high) costs. See
generally Peter Siegelman & Joel Waldfogel, Toward a Taxonomy of Disputes: New
Evidence Through the Prism of the Priest/Klein Model, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 101, 103
(1999); Clarke, supra note 289, at 128 (arguing that “parties tend to do things when they
predict that the expected benefits exceed the expected costs”). Moreover, FISA protects
private companies to some extent, and it even grants some companies retroactive
immunity from liability. Prior to the FAA in 2008, many lawsuits were filed against
telecommunications companies for cooperation with the NSA outside of FISA. Eventually,
the FAA awarded these companies retroactive immunity from liability and the cases were
dismissed. In addition to immunity, the government reimburses any electronic
communications service provider for providing information, facilities, or assistance in
accordance with the statutory framework. Under this provision, compliance is costless, at
least in the monetary sense, and incentivizes companies to comply with FISC orders. See
50 U.S.C. § 1881a(h)(2) (2012); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal.
2006), remanded by 539 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008).
293 Although there are some indications that few companies did challenge FISC
orders, many others did not. Yahoo!, Lavabit, and Apple apparently fought governmental
orders to turn over data. See Schneier, supra note 143.
294 Under the proposed bill (which was not enacted), the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB)—an independent agency that works within the
executive branch of the U.S. government to review executive branch actions and ensure
a balance with privacy and civil liberties—would have served as a Special Advocate
Board in FISC. See Ensuring Adversarial Process in the FISA Court Act, H.R. 3159,
113th Cong. (2013). Under the proposed bill, PCLOB would appoint:
(1) attorneys to serve as public interest advocates in proceedings before the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court [FISC], a judge of the petition review
pool, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review [FISCR], and the
Supreme Court under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
[FISA]; and (2) technical and subject-matter experts [including experts of
computer networks, telecommunications, encryption, and cybersecurity], not
employed by the Federal Government, to be available to assist [such
advocates] in performing their duties.
Id. The proposed bill required such courts, in any matter “involving a significant
interpretation or construction of [FISA],” to appoint at least one public interest
advocate who would: (1) “participate fully with the same rights and privileges as the
Federal Government;” (2) “represent . . . the interests of the people of the United States
in preserving privacy and civil liberties, including with respect to . . . rights . . . under
the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution;” and (3) “have access to all relevant
evidence” as well as the authority to petition the court to order the government to
produce other necessary evidence. Id. For another proposition, see also the FISA Court
Reform Act of 2013, S. 1467, 113th Cong. (2013).
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processing large volumes of data, and applying data analytics
to identify patterns and correlations in order to detect suspicious
behavior.295 The use of big data and social media analytics for
monitoring threats, predicting harmful activities, and prevention,
require access to bulk data. Consequently, it is no longer
sufficient to acquire an individual warrant in order the perform
law enforcement tasks. This may render conventional legal
oversight, which is tailored to authorize data collection based on
reasonable suspicion, redundant. The nature of mass surveillance
and big data analytics requires blanket orders, and thus calls for
a different type of legal intervention to safeguard civil liberties.
2. Promoting Transparency
There are various legal suggestions on how to provide
better checks and balances on PPPs.296 Some suggestions focus
on transparency. These strategies assume that insight into the
actions of the NSA and private companies could increase
oversight. GGSR, for example, has reached a deal with the
Obama Administration, allowing companies to disclose more
information on the customer data they are compelled to share

295 On the use of predicting strategies based on data analysis for law enforcement
purposes, see Jane Bambauer, Hassle, 113 MICH. L. REV. 461 (2015); Tal Zarsky,
Governmental Data Mining and Its Alternatives, 116 PENN. ST. L. REV. 285 (2011).
296 For example, in an open letter to President Obama and to Members of
Congress, GGSR urged the government to reform government surveillance practices
worldwide. See Global Government Surveillance Reform, supra note 250. GGSR claim
that they are “focused on keeping users’ data secure,” and that they are “pushing back
on government requests to ensure that they are legal and reasonable in scope.” Id.
GGSR proposes five principles for reform: (1) “[l]imiting [g]overnments’ [a]uthority to
[c]ollect [u]sers’ [i]nformation.” This first principle should be achieved by codifying
“sensible limitations” on government’s “ability to compel service providers to disclose user
data that balance their need for the data in limited circumstances, users’ reasonable
privacy interests, and the impact on trust in the Internet.” Id. Furthermore,
governmental surveillance should be limited “to specific, known users for lawful purposes,
and should not undertake bulk data collection of Internet communications. . . . [and] (2)
[o]versight and [a]ccountability.” Id. This creates strong checks and balances for
intelligence agencies seeking to collect or compel the production of information. Id. In
addition, “[r]eviewing courts should be independent and include an adversarial process,
and governments should allow important rulings of law to be made public in a timely
manner so that the courts are accountable to an informed citizenry.” Id. (3)
“Transparency [a]bout [g]overnment [d]emands. Governments [will] allow companies to
publish the number and nature of government demands for user information,” and
“promptly disclose this data publicly.” Id. (4) “Respecting the [f]ree [f]low of
[i]nformation . . . Governments should permit the transfer of data and . . . not inhibit
access by companies or individuals to lawfully available information . . . stored outside of
the country . . . [and] should not require service providers to locate infrastructure within a
country’s borders or operate locally” (5) “Avoiding [c]onflicts [a]mong [g]overnments.”
GGSR suggests “a robust, principled, and transparent framework to govern lawful requests
for data across jurisdictions . . . [When] the laws of one jurisdiction conflict with the laws of
another . . . governments should work together to resolve the conflict.” Id.
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with the government.297 But this does not apply to PPPs, and
therefore does not offer any check on informal collaboration.
This “transparency arrangement” discloses the number of
national security orders and requests issued to communications
providers, the number of customer accounts targeted under those
orders and requests, and the underlying legal authorities.298 In
addition, companies will be allowed to publish reports listing the
number of security letters they receive from the FBI, and how
many customer accounts those letters affect (to the nearest
thousand). Some of these orders are subject to a six-month delay,
or a two-year delay once a government agency develops a
surveillance effort on “a platform, product or service (whether
developed or acquired) for which the company has not previously
received such an order.”299 Notably, other forms of the invisible
handshake, such as “upstream” collection, are not handled
through this agreement.300
This sort of limited transparency might raise public
awareness of the invisible handshake and the sharing of
information with governmental agencies. Yet it will likely have
only a limited impact; the arrangement permits the government
to issue bulk orders. In other words, while a single order might
be reported, its scope and potential impact will be concealed.
Also, public reports on information sharing with governments
might harm the financial interests of online intermediaries by
generating mistrust and chilling users away from the service.
This may create further incentives for governments and
companies to opt for informal information sharing.
297 See Spencer Ackerman, Tech Giants Reach White House Deal on NSA
Surveillance of Customer Data, GUARDIAN (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2014/jan/27/tech-giants-white-house-deal-surveillance-customer-data [https://perma.c
c/4ETB-NFY3].
298 What was revealed thus far? Tens of thousands of Microsoft, Google, Facebook
and Yahoo! accounts have their data turned over to U.S. government authorities. See
Ackerman, supra note 140. But the precise numbers and types of requests the companies
received were not revealed. Furthermore, this information was received via court
orders, and we are unaware of the NSA information gathering under Executive Order
12,333, and outside the legal process via the invisible handshake. Which companies
announced that they require a warrant for handing out content? An annual report by
the EFF on online service provider’s privacy and transparency practices regarding
government access to user data reveals interesting results. See Who Has Your Back?,
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/who-has-your-back-2014 [https://perma.cc/B
QA6-TJ7D]. The EFF examined the announced privacy and transparency practices of
twenty-six U.S. companies. Id. As for voluntary disclosure of information, the EFF found
that prior to 2014, only twelve companies announced that they require a warrant for
handing out content. Id. Since 2014, however, that number increased to twenty-three
companies. Id. Which companies still do not specify that a warrant is required to access
their content?: AT&T, Comcast, and Snapchat. Id.
299 See Ackerman, supra note 140.
300 Id.
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Others have suggested obligating private companies to file
reports that disclose any informal or formal agreement to share or
transfer information.301 Congress, for example, could limit the
companies’ ability to transfer users’ data; increase oversight over
the governmental programs;302 and perhaps even restrict
governmental agencies’ ability to acquire access to certain types of
data. Congress could further implement barriers to information
collection (such as time limits on data retention), and require
governmental agencies and companies to make full transparency
reports to Congress, which could examine whether both sides of
these PPPs acted lawfully. But as this article argues, these
suggested practices are either inapplicable or may seriously
compromise the government’s ability to govern. Therefore,
governments would be required to acquire information only
through bulk orders, which also lack sufficient legal oversight
and, therefore, fail to offer a better safeguard to civil liberties.
3. Are Online Intermediaries State Actors?
The informal collaboration of government and online
intermediaries generates a legal twilight zone. Prior to the
enactment of the Cybersecurity Act, such collaborations were
almost entirely outside the reach of the rule of law and the
Constitution did not apply to them. Yet the Cybersecurity Act
does little to remedy this problem. This regulatory scheme falls
short of offering a comprehensive framework for voluntary PPPs,
as its vague legal standards leave much discretion to online
intermediaries working in the shadow of the law.303 Therefore, it
fails to offer proper checks and balances. This legal framework
merely grants immunity to private companies, allowing them to
either begin, or continue, to collaborate with the government.
A partial solution for bringing PPPs under the rule of
law would be to treat private companies that divulge
information to the government as state actors.304 As state
301 Jon Michaels proposed to require corporations to file reports under seal, to
members of the House and Senate intelligence and judiciary committees and to the
inspector general of the participating government agency, summarizing any agreement
“to share or transfer information about U.S. persons to military or intelligence
agencies.” See Michaels, supra note 53, at 952–53.
302 As Jon Michaels proposed, increasing the current data Congress currently
receives, along with holding hearings to investigate programs, could solve part of the
problems emerging from current PPPs. See id. at 953–57.
303 See supra Section III.B.
304 For a broader discussion of the state action doctrine, see Daphne BarakErez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169
(1995); Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503 (1985); Ira
Nerken, A New Deal for the Protection of Fourteenth Amendment Rights: Challenging
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actors, the actions of online intermediaries under the invisible
handshake are not only made visible, but are also subject to the
principles of the Constitution—mainly, the First and Fourth
Amendments. Treating private companies as state actors will
require transparency and oversight. Those private companies
cannot receive full immunity for sharing information with the
government and would be subject to review and constitutional
scrutiny.305 Knowing that their actions as state actors are
subject to review and constitutional scrutiny, companies may
alter their data-sharing practices.
Pragmatically, however, even if private companies are
treated as state actors, holding them accountable for their
actions will be fairly difficult: as long as PPPs are kept secret,
the odds of imposing liability are extremely low. Note that even
after Snowden’s revelation on the involvement of nine Internet
companies in PRISM, there was no actual proof of their
participation in such a program.306
C.

Organizational Design

Many of the Congressional efforts to restrain the use of
power by the government via PPPs, have focused either on the
scope of data sharing (e.g., the Cybersecurity Act) or the process of
obtaining data (e.g., FISA orders). These attempts fail to
recognize the increasing reliance of governments on online
intermediaries for effective governance. They assume that
governmental agencies will need to access the information flow
only occasionally and that such access will be focused on
predefined targets—sporadic, and limited in scope. This approach
overlooks the governance crisis and the growing dependency of
governmental agencies on systematic access to the information
flow as a means of governance. This crisis is not tied to a
particular emergency or national security crisis. It is essentially
the new challenge of governing behavior in a networked
information era.
The governance crisis demands new governance tools that
will allow governments to perform their duties in a networked
the Doctrinal Bases of the Civil Rights Cases and State Action Theory, 12 CIV. RTS.-CIV.
LIBERTIES. L. REV. 297 (1977).
305 See generally Barak-Erez, supra note 304; Chemerinsky, supra note 304;
Nerken, supra note 304.
306 See, e.g., T.C. Sottek & Joshua Kopstein, Everything You Need to Know
About PRISM, VERGE (July 17, 2013), http://www.theverge.com/2013/7/17/4517480/nsaspying-prism-surveillance-cheat-sheet [https://perma.cc/3WR9-V8A2] (“The companies at
the heart of PRISM’s controversy are also acting out, but the specific details regarding
their involvement in government surveillance on US citizens is still unclear.”).
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environment. The challenge is to design such measures so that
they will not jeopardize the enormous advantages of a free and
open information flow. Consequently, the governance crisis may
require adjustment of the traditional checks and balances. We
must move beyond revising the scope of governmental authority
in specific rules, or refining the judicial process to allow more
meaningful legal oversight in acquiring bulk data. The
governance crisis may require new thinking of the organizational
design to allow data sharing and secure civil rights.
For instance, instead of focusing on how to regulate and
monitor the acquisition of information, policymakers may focus
their attention on the way data is being used after it has been
obtained through PPPs. Under this approach, Congress would
not place restrictions on the sharing of data but instead on the
use of it. Enforcement agencies and companies would not be
restricted in their sharing of data to those times where a “cyber
threat indicator” of any sort is present. The use of such
information by governmental agencies, however obtained, will
be strictly regulated and subject to legal oversight.
Oversight might also be reconsidered in terms of
organizational design. Oversight should not be limited to selfreporting by online intermediaries, or by governmental agencies
furnishing transparency reports to Congress. The implementation
of oversight could be achieved by reshaping the organizational
design and integrating oversight into the structure and the
ongoing process of using the data. When oversight is built into
the organizational structure, it may offer a more robust safeguard
to civil rights. Oversight, for instance, could be conducted by an
impartial entity—external to the executive branch—that is
integrated into the process and physically present at intelligence
and enforcement agencies. This new function could be tasked
with reviewing the agency’s day-to-day use of information and
internal policies regarding the use of information. Both
government agents and the entity tasked with oversight could
be held personally liable for any unlawful practices under both
civil and criminal law in order to promote accountability. This
practice both recognizes the need to obtain bulk data and, at
the same time, improves legal certainty by placing limitations
on any misuse of data rather than its sharing.
CONCLUSION
Information sharing between governmental agencies and
private companies is not likely to cease in the digital age; it is
necessary for the new challenges of governance. But a democratic
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society cannot allow information sharing practices to occur in a
legal twilight zone. If PPP practices will continue in their current
form in the United States—and worldwide—then the rule of law
and civil liberties might be at risk. To strike a proper balance
between national security needs and civil liberties, policymakers
must rethink their traditional approaches to legal intervention.
Proposals to increase oversight and transparency fall short
of addressing the challenges arising from the need to give the
government systematic access to information flow. Such proposals
will only aid in upholding the rule of law at the margins. In an era
of big data, providing proper oversight through traditional judicial
review will be almost impossible; FISC decisions proved that.307
Calls to increase transparency suffer from similar limitations.
Transparency will be difficult to achieve due to the sensitive
nature of information and the need to act, at least occasionally,
under the veil of secrecy. This inevitability weakens the
incentives of public representatives to act vigorously in
restraining the use of power by the executive branch as the
actions that must be kept secret are rarely politically rewarding.
While the use of warrant canaries, or other transparency efforts,
should be encouraged, they are insufficient to achieve the level
of transparency necessary for upholding the rule of law.
This article argues that in devising policies to address
governance by online intermediaries, policymakers should
assume that this emerging model of governance is here to stay.
Consequently, efforts to restore the checks placed on
governmental power should focus on systematic collaboration
between governments and online intermediaries. The governance
crisis may require new thinking about organizational design in
order to allow data sharing while simultaneously securing civil
rights. One option, for instance, is for policymakers to focus on
the use of information—not the methods by which it was
obtained—and impose external oversight by an impartial entity
on the use of information by governmental agencies.
The Snowden revelations provoked numerous reform
initiatives in an attempt to restore civil rights in a networked
information society. These initiatives assumed that the informal
collaboration disclosed by Snowden was the exception.
Consequently, reform initiatives were mostly patchwork repairs
to the existing rules and processes. This type of collaboration is a
response to a deeper governance crisis caused by distributed
networks, to which the government responded with new modus

307

See supra Section IV.B.1.
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operandi. Therefore, governance by proxy requires rethinking the
current checks on governmental powers.
If the governance crisis deepens, then online intermediaries
are likely to face growing pressure to serve as proxies for
governance, and the potential risks to our liberties could rise
substantially. As such, a proper legal intervention is crucial now for
preserving human rights and liberties in the future.

